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71 1.  Introduction 
The  subject  of  this  report  is  the  medium  and  long 
run  development  of European  labour markets.  With  European 
economies  only  just  emerging  from  the  most  dramatic 
episode  in  their  postwar  history  - an  episode  which  has 
its  epicentre  in  the  labour  markets  it  is  of 
unquestionable  importance  to  stand  back  and  evaluate  the 
prospects  for  Europ•an  labour  markets  from  a  longer  run 
perspective  taking  into consideration  both the  underlying 
demographic  and  technological  developments  and  the 
effects  that  the  completion  of  the  internal  market  in -2-
1992  may  have. 
We  start  with  a  discussion  of  the  evolution  of  the 
underlying  fundamentals  of  labour  markets  - demographic 
factors,  participation  rates  and  so  forth  - with  the 
objective  of  deciding  whether  the  unfavourable 
developments  of  the  70's  and  80's  were  but  an  isolated 
historical  event  or,  on  the  contrary,  that  similar 
developments  will  characterize  the  future  as  well.  We 
argue  in  section  3_that  the  problems  of  the  next  twenty 
years  will  differ  from  those  of  the  last  twenty  and  that 
policies  favourable  to  increased  labour  force 
participation are called for. 
From  this  same  long  run  perspective,  we  then  discuss 
in  section  4  the  impact  of  continuing  technological 
advance  on  the  structure  of  employment  and  the  relative 
demand  for  skilled  and  unskilled  labour.  Our 
interpretation  of  current ·trends  leads  us  yet  again  to 
draw  attention  on  the  need  for  adequate  flexibility  in 
wage  differentials  while  simultaneously  adopting  measures 
aiming  at  improving  the  skill  structure  of  the  Community 
workforce. 
This  is  followed  up  in  section  5  by  a  discussion  of 
education  policy  in  the  Community.  We  believe  that  a 
major  expansion  of adult  education  is called for.  Howe.ver 
the  method  of  financing  such  an  expansion  may  well  be 
different  from  that  of  current  youth  education.  Current 
programs  designed  to  foster  the  emergence  of  a  truly 
European  system of  higher  education  should be  pursued  and 
strengthened. 
One  of  the  major  impacts  of  the  1992  program  may  be -3-
a  significant  increase  in  worker  mobility.  Section  6 
addresses  this  issue  arguing  that  exploitation  of  the 
potential  gains  hinges  on  the  adoption  of  a  deliberate 
strategy  of  eliminating  all  removable  obstacles  to  the 
relocation  of  workers.  We  then  analyse  the  implications 
of  this  for  the  structure  of  unemployment  insurance  and 
pension plans in the Community. 
Finally,  noting  that  recent  experience  highlights 
the  importance  of  labour  market  structures  and 
institutions  for  economic  performance,  we  speculate  in 
section  7  as  to  how  the  formation  of  an  integrated goods 
and  labour market  in Europe  might  impinge  on  the existing 
national  labour  market  institutions  and  the  associated 
incentives  for  change.  Will  the  completion  of  the 
internal  market  improve  or  worsen  the  performance  of 
existing  national  institutions?  To  what  extent  is  the 
internal  market  compatible  with  the  perpetuation  of  a 
diversity  of  national  wage-bargaining  institutions? 
Should  we  expect,  on  the  other  hand,  that  this  new 
environment  will  lead to  the  emergence  of  a  single  form 
of  labour  market  organisation,  and  is it likely  to  be  a 
desirable  one?  These  issues  are  important  because  the 
effects  of  economic  integration  with  given  institutions 
may  well  be  dwarfed  by  effects  resulting  from 
institutional  changes  stimulated  by  the  creation  of  the 
Single market. 
One  of  our  goals  being  the  identification  of  the 
potential  problems  of  the  future  and  a  reflexion  on  the 
reforms  which  ought  to  be  recommended,  we  introduce  our 
discussion  of  these  different  issues  with  a  review,  in -4-
the  next  section,  of  the  principles  which  should  guide 
the  design  of  policy  interventions  in  a  federal 
environment.  We  focus  on  the  definition  of  the  level 
(local,  state  or  Community)  at  which  labour  market 
regulation should take place. 
2.  The  level of regulation 
Before  plunging  into  the  prospects  for  the  labour 
market  and  accompanying  policy  measures,  we  must  first 
spend  a  few  moments  adumbrating  some  basic  principles 
concerning  the  appropriate  level  at  which  policy 
intervention  should  take  place.  The  internal  market 
program  has  led  to  an  increasing  volume  of  regulation 
being  initiated  at  the  Community  level,  rather  than  by 
national  governments,  and  this  tendency  looks  set  to 
continue  as  integration  proceeds.  This  has  provoked 
fierce  resistance  in  some  quarters,  with  opponents 
arguing  that  "competition  between  rules"  is  a  better 
principle  than  the  imposition  of  monolithic  rules  at  the 
supra-national  level.  However,  the  principles  behind  the 
stance  of  the  protagonists  in this  debate  are  not  always 
as  clear  as  they  might  be,  with  the  result  that  it  is 
prone to generate more  heat  than light. 
First,  let  us  recall  that  intervention  is  only 
warranted  on  efficiency  grounds  when  there  is  some 
identifiable  market  failure  or  imperfection  present.  (We 
should  emphasise  at  this  point  that  the  rubric 
"regulation"  covers  not  only  direct  quantitative 
controls,  but  also  any  taxes,  or subsidies,  introduced to -5-
offset the  original distortion.  There  is  some  presumption 
in  favour  of  the  latter  when  they  are  available,  as  the 
rents  associated with the policy action usually  accrue to 
the  government,  rather  than  particular  individuals.)  A 
classic  case  is  that  of  a  factory  producing  effluent 
which  adversely  affects  the  environment.  Left  to 
themselves  the  owners  of the  factory will  not  incorporate 
these  external  costs  in  choosing  the  production  methods 
or  output  levels.  A  pollution  tax,  or  controls  on  the 
emission  of  effluent,  can  ensure  that  these  external, 
social costs are correctly taken account of. 
This  example  is  one  where  intervention  is  clearly 
beneficial,  but  a  similar  principle  operates  in  other, 
less  transparent  cases.  Where  there  is  no  market 
imperfection  the  case  for  intervention  is  weak  - "if it 
ain't  broke,  don't  fix  it".  But  a  second  requirement  is 
that  when  things are  "broke"  the  government  also  has  the 
means  and  the  information  required  to  fix  them.  A  third 
requirement  is  that  governments  act  in  a  benevolent 
-fashion  and  that  the  intervention  does  not  introduce 
offsetting  bureaucratic  inefficiencies  (this  is  an  issue 
we  turn  to  below).  Finally  any  intervention  should  bear 
as directly as possible on the market  failure. 
Suppose  all  these  conditions  are  met  and  that  there 
is  a  case  for  intervention.  At  what  level  should it then 
take  place?  To  begin  with,  the  appropriate  amount  of 
regulation  is  likely to  vary  between  countries  according 
to  their  particular  circumstances.  The  cultural 
background,  industrial  composition  and  so  forth  differ 
greatly  between  member  states  of  the  Community. -6-
Furthermore  the  national  authorities  are  likely  to  be 
better  informed  about  local  conditions  than  any  supra-
national  body.  If,  as  generally  seems  to  be  the  case, 
regulation at  the  supra-national  level  is also  associated 
with  uniformity  of  regulation  across  countries,  there  is 
a  presumption  in  favour  of  regulation  at  the  national 
level,  or indeed at even  lower administrative levels. 
In  that  case  why  should  there  ever  be  regulation  at 
the  supra-national  level?  The  answer  follows  the  same 
logic  as  that  behind  the  original  case  for  intervention, 
namely  the  existence  of  some  market  failure,  although 
this  time  operating  at  the  national  level  rather  than . 
that of the individual producer or consumer. 
An  example  should make  this clear.  Consider  the  case 
of  health  and  safety  at  work  regulations.  There  are  at 
least  two  reasons  for  these.  First,  some  of  the  costs  of 
accidents  at  work  and  occupational  illnesses are  borne  by 
society  at  large,  rather  than  the  firm  or  the  workerl; 
there  is  thus  a  clear  market  failure  of  the  sort 
-discussed earlier.  Second,  there  is  evidence  that  people 
systematically  underestimate  their  chances  of 
experiencing  an  accident  or  suffering  illness2. 
Consequently  on  both  counts  firms  will  tend  to 
underprovide  safety  equipment,  etc.,  and  state 
intervention to  enforce  adequate  safety  levels  is  called 
for. 
Now  consider  a  national policy  maker  deciding  on  the 
1.  Th~s is obviously true with a  public health system.  It is equally 
true with a  health system relying on private insurance where other 
members  of the scheme  bear the costs through higher premia. 
2.  see G.  Akerlof  and w.  Dickens,  "The  Economic  Consequences of 
Cognitive Dissonance",  Am8rican  Economic  Revtew,  1982. -7-
appropriate  level  of  health  and  safety  regulation.  Such 
regulation  is  not  generally  costless  and  will  lower 
productivity  and  output  in  the  economy  below  what  it 
would  otherwise  be.  The  policy  maker  will  then  trade  off 
the  benefits  of  safer  workplaces  against  the  cost  in 
terms  of  lower  output.  In  a  closed  economy,  the  policy 
maker  would  then  arrive  at  the  socially  most  desirable 
level  of  regulation.  However,  in  an  open  economy  this 
need  not  be  the  case.  If capital  is internationally more 
mobile  than  labour  then  the  policy  maker,  by  requiring  a 
somewhat  lower  level  of  workplace  safety,  can  encourage 
firms  to  locate  in  his  country  rather  than  abroad. 
However,  this  neglects  the  adverse  effects  such  action 
will  have  on  the  level  of  output  and  welfare  abroad.  If 
all  countries  behave  in  this  fashion  then  the  resulting 
level  of  workplace  safety  in all countries  will  be  lower 
than is desirable3. 
The  argument  here exactly parallels the  argument  for 
th~  international  coordination  of  macroeconomic  policies 
that  was  analysed  in  a  previous  report  of  the  group4.  In 
the  presence  of  (non-pecuniary)  external  costs  or 
benefits,  coordination  can  improve  on  competitive 
sovereign  policy  making.  The  moral  is  that  the  level  at 
4.  As  an example of this reasoning,  suppose that for two  countries,  A 
and B,  output is given by: 
Yi  •  (1-xi)Kia  (i •  A,B;  a  < 1) 
where  Xi  is a  measure of the level of safety regulation and Ki  is the 
stock of capital. Capital is internationally mobile  and the total 
world stock of capital,  KA+Ks,  is fixed.  Suppose social welfare in 
each country is given by xtbYi1-b.  Then  the socially optimal level of 
safety regulation  (achieved with supranational regulation)  is given 
by  x  - b.  With  (competitive)  national regulation,  however,  the level 
of regulation is only  x  •  b(l-a)/(1-ba). 
4.  See J.  Dr~ze, c.  Wyplosz,  c.  Bean,  F.  Giavazzi and H.  Giersch,  %bA 
Two-Han4ed  Growth  Strategy for lyrope:  Autonomy  through flexible 
Cooperation,  Center for European Policy Studies,  P&per  34,  1987 -8-
which  regulatory  decisions  are  made  should  be  just 
sufficiently  decentralised  to  ensure  that  all  external 
costs  and  benefits  are  taken  account  of.  In  practice,  of 
course,  there  is  likely  to  be  a  trade-off  between  the 
greater  flexibility  afforded  by  regulation  at  a  low 
level,  and  the  fuller  account  of  external  costs  and 
benefits  that  takes  place  when  regulatory  decisions  are 
formed  at  a  high  level.  In  some  cases  the  need  for  local 
flexibility  will  be  quantitatively  more  important.  In 
other  cases  external  effects  between  countries  may 
dominate. 
So  far  we  have  assumed  that  policy  makers  are 
entirely  benevolent  and  act  in  the  best  interests  of 
society  as  a  whole.  In  practice  this  is  not  always  the 
case,  and pressure groups  are  likely to  seek  to influence 
decisions  in order to  favour  themselves  at the  expense  of 
other  sections  of  society.  This  can  be  thought  of  as  a 
bureaucratic  inefficiency  in  decision  making  and  adds  an 
important extra  dimension  to the question  of the  level at 
which  regulation  should  take  place.  Such  "rent-seeking" 
activities  could  lead  to  intervention  levels  that  are 
either too  high  or  too  low  from  a  social  perspective.  In 
either  case  international  "competition  between  rules" 
will  limit  the  gains  from  such  activities,  if the  people 
or  firms  who  lose out  can easily move  elsewhere. 
Thus  suppose  unions  in  one  country  successfully 
lobby  for  laws  that enhance  their bargaining  strength and 
reduce  profitability.  This  will  encourage  firms  to 
relocate  in  other  countries  where  the  laws  are  not  so 
favourable  to  organised  labour.  This  in  turn will  reduce -9-
living standards in the original  country,  and  thus  temper 
the  willingness  of  policy  makers  to  introduce  such 
legislation in the first place. 
This  argument  obviously  tends  to  favour  placing  the 
burden  of  regulation  at  as  low  a  level  in  the  hierarchy 
of  decision-making  bodies  as  possible.  However,  the 
"competition  between  rules"  mechanism  will  only  work  in 
limiting bureaucratic  inefficiencies  when  people  or  firms 
are  internationally  mobileS,  and  it  is  under  precisely 
these  conditions  that  the  earlier  "externalities" 
argument  for  supra-national  regulation  applies.  Since  one 
consequence  of  the  internal  market  program  should  be  an 
increase  in the mobility of capital and  labour  throughout 
the  Community,  it  simultaneously  strengthens  both  the 
case  for  supra-national  regulation,  and  the  case  for 
competition  between different national  regulating bodies! 
A  general  statement  that  one  approach  always  dominates 
the  other  does  not  seem  to  be  possible;  a  case-by-case 
approach is unavoidable. 
The  discussion  so  far  has  concerned  only  regulation 
for  efficiency  reasons.  In  practice,  of  course,  there  is 
often  an  important  equity  element  in  some  regulations. 
Thus  minimum  wage  legislation  might  be  justified purely 
,on  efficiency  grounds  where  employers  are  in  a 
monopsonistic  position  and  can  use  their  market  power  to 
force  down  wages.  More  usually,  however,  its primary  aim 
is to  narrow  the  wage  distribution  and,  in  a  competitive 
5.  Sometimes  ofcouree,  factor immobility may  itself be a  consequence 
of regulation or other policy interventions.  A case in point would be 
regulations  l~ting the international portability of pensions 
(discueeed below in section 6.3).  In that case the appropriate 
conclusion will usually be to ·remove  the policy restricting mobility. -10-
labour  market  at  least,  this  is  likely  to  raise  the 
unemployment  rate  for  unskilled  labour  and  have  adverse 
effects  on  economic  efficiency.  Such  equity-oriented 
regulations need,  for  obvious  reasons,  to  be  enacted at  a 
sufficiently  aggregated  level  to  encompass  all  the 
parties  concerned&.  Thus,  if  the  concern  is  with  equity 
within  a  country,  there  is  no  reason  for  legislation  to 
be  enacted  at  a  supra-national  level,  but  if  the 
objective  is  equity  at  a  Community-wide  level  then 
legislation at  a  Community  level is also called for. 
Bearing  in  mind  these  principles  let  us  now  turn  to 
a  closer  analysis  of  trends  and  policy  options  in  the 
labour market. 
3.  The  evolution of the workforce 
In  this  section  we  evaluate  the  implications  of 
changes  in  the  size,  composition  and  characteristics  of 
the  European  workforce  in  the  medium  term.  The 
determining  factors  are partly demographic  - the  size  and 
composition  of  the  population  - and  partly  cultural  -
participation rates among  the young,  elderly and  women. 
3.1  A  "greving" population 
Since  1960  the  growth  rate  of  the  population  has 
been  decreasing  in the  industrialised world.  Furthermore, 
this  trend  has  been  more  pronounced  in  Europe  than 
elsewhere.  Between  1973  and  1988,  the  EC  population 
6.  Equity-oriented interventions are ofcourse subject to the same 
qualifications as those introduced above  in the case of efficiency-
oriented regulations. - 11-
increased by  only  St.  The  comparative  figure  for  the  USA 
and  Japan  respectively is 16t  and 13t'.  This  evolution is 
due  to  three  factors:  a  decrease  in  the  birth  rate  -
since  the  1970's  the  average  number  of  births  per  woman 
(fertility  rate)  has  even  slipped  below  the  critical 
level  (2.1)  necessary  for population  renewal;  a  reduction 
in  immigration  flows  from  outside  the  community;  and  a 
slowdown  in the rate of increase in life expectancy. 
Barring major  changes  in  immigration  flows  (see  next 
section)  we  do  not  expect  to  see  any  immediate  reversal 
of  this  trend.  The  reduced  fertility  rate  is  largely  a 
result  of  social  changes  which  have  led  many  women  to 
favour  pursuing  independent  careers  ahead of marriage  and 
raising  a  family.  While  female  participation  rates  have 
risen markedly  (see  below),  they  remain  relatively  low  in 
some  countries,  particularly in  Ireland and  Spain.  A rise 
in  female  participation rates  in these countries  would  be 
likely  to  be  associated  with  a  further  reduction  in  the 
fe~tility rate.  In  any  case,  the total population  size of 
industrialised  countries,  at  the  horizon  2010,  is  quite 
insensitive  to  alternative  hypotheses  regarding  the 
fertility rate&. 
Table  1  however  shows  that  the  working  age 
population  has  continued  to  grow  steadily  at  a  rate  of 
.6%  per  annum  between  1950  and  1990.  It is estimated,  and 
this  is  the  relevant  statistic  from  our  perspective, 
that,  although  the absolute  number  of people  in the  15-64 
age  group  will  soon  be  decreasing  and  their  average  age 
1.  See J.C.  Cheanaia,  Population Trends  in the EC,  1960-1986, 
European Journal of Population,  vol.3,  1987 
9.  Employment  Perapeetiyea,  OBCD,  1988 -12-
will be  growing,  the share of this age  group  in the total 
population  will  remain  stable  at  around  66t,  at  least 
until  2010  (possibly 2020). 
The  relative  stability of  the  population  of  working 
age,  in  the  absolute,  and  as  a  proportion  of  the  total 
population,  is  to  be  contrasted  with  the  increasing 
proportion  of  the  population  aged  65  and  over,  expected 
to rise  from  15.9%  in  1980  to  17.3%  in  2010  with  sizable 
differences  across  countries:  France,  16.3%;  Germany, 
20.4%;  and  UK,  14.6%,  for  instance9. 
3.2  The  immigration p{ospects 
Increased  immigration  might  provide  an  offsetting 
factor  to  falling  fertility  rates.  Could  it  prove 
quantitatively  sufficiently  significant  to  provide  an 
overall  increase  in  population  growth  rates?  Before  the 
recent events  in Eastern  Europe  a  negative  answer  to this 
question  could  have  been  provided  with  some  confidence. 
Indeed  the  political  climate  in  most  EC  countries 
appeared  geared  toward  a  continued  slow-down  rather  than 
an  acceleration  in  immigration  from  outside  the 
Community.  Things  have  changed  in  the  last  few  months. 
The  number  of  East  Germans  who  have  immigrated  into  West 
Germany  in  1989  is  estimated at  about  350,00010.  In  that 
year  the  total  number  of  immigrants  coming  from  the  East 
into  West  Germany  is  estimated  to  have  exceeded  700'000 
individuals,  of  which  400' 000  were  of  working  age.  This 
corresponds  to  an  increase  in  the  labour  force  of  about 
13  Le  vieillissement dtmoaraphique;  cons6guences  pour la politique 
sociale,  OECD  1988;  Non  weighted EC12  average. 
10.  The  Economist,  December  23,  1989 I) 
-13-
1.3%.  The  key  question  is whether  immigration  flows  from 
the  East  will  continue  at  the  present  or  even  greater 
pace  (as  appears  to  be  the  case  at  the  time  this  lines 
are  written- January  1990)  and  whether  they  will  spread 
to  countries  other  than  East  Germany,  or  whether  they 
will  soon  subside  leaving  1989  as  a  unique  event 
providing  only  a  temporary  respite  from  the  downward 
trend in population growth. 
The  answer  to  this  question  is  unctear  at  the 
moment.  However  the  fact  that  the  political  factors 
behind  emigration  flows  are  gradually  being  replaced  by 
economic  considerations  suggests  that the market  may  help 
to  prevent  them  presenting  a  major  unemployment  problem 
for  the  West  for  such  flows  shou·ld  rarify  if  ever  the 
probability  of  employment  in  the  receiving  country 
becomes too  low.  In other words,  the  very  fact  that these 
flows  should  be  responsive  to  economic  conditions  leads 
us  to  be  fairly  sanguine  about  their  overall  impact  on 
European  labour markets. 
3.3 varying participation rotes 
Another  offsetting  factor  to  the  "greying"  of  the 
population  might  be  an  increase  in  participatio'n  rates. 
At  the  aggregate  level,  the  average  participation  rate 
has  been  quite  stable  in  the  EC  in  the  recent  past, 
standing  at  around  64,,  although  with  very  different 
patterns  of  evolution  from  one  country  to the  next.  From 
1973  to  1988  for  example,  it  decreased  from  71.6Sfs  to 
65.5%  in Portugal,  while it increased  from  59%  to  65'  in 
Italy.  Note  that  participation  rates  are  somewhat  lower - 14-
in  Europe  than  in  either  the  US  (1988:  76%)  or  Japan 
(1988:  72.5%)11.  More  instructive observations  can be  made 
at the disaggregated level. 
The  rate  of participation  of  the  young  is  primarily 
determined  by  the  duration  of  education  for  a  given 
individual  as  well  as  participation  rates  in  higher 
education.  The  age  of  entry  into  the  labour  force  has 
risen  almost  everywhere  since  the  1960's,  with  the 
notable  exception  of  the  US  and  Canada,  in  conformity 
with  the  observed  tendency  for  increased  education  and 
training.  In  some  countries  this  movement  has  been 
exacerbated  by  the  difficulties  encountered  by  young 
people  in  finding  jobs  in  the  presence  of  high 
unemployment.  There  are  forces  which  are  likely  to  pull 
in  both  directions  in  the  future.  They  are  likely  to 
approximately  offset  one  another  and  lead  to  a 
stabilization in participation rates  of the  young.  First, 
participation  rates  will  probably  increase  as  labour 
markets  tighten.  Second,  the  increased  rapidity  of 
technical  change  means  that  skills  are  likely  to  become 
obsolete  more  quickly  (see  below).  The  reduced  repayment 
period  for  investment  in  human  capital  may  well  lead  to 
reduced  time  spent  by  a  given  individual  in  vocational 
training  at  the  start  of  the  life  cycle  in  favour  of 
periods  of  reskilling  and  retraining  later  in  life. 
Against  this,  the  apparent  bias  in  technical  change 
towards  increased  use  of  skilled  labour  and  away  from 
unskilled  labour  (again  see  below)  is  likely  to  lead  to 
increased  participation  in  technical  and 
12.  Le  march6  du travail dans  la Communaut6,  Co~ssion des 
Communaut6s  Europ6ennes,  Economie  Europtenne,  38,  1988 
higher -15-
education. 
Participation  rates  of  mature  workers  in  the  labour 
force  are  tied  to  the  age  of  retirement.  They  have 
decreased  everywhere  since  the  1960's.  Table  2  shows 
their  precise  evolution  for  a  sample  of  EC  countries 
since  1965.  What  we  observe  is  in  part  the  result  of 
early  retirement  measures  that  have  been  adopted  by 
governments  as  a  way  to  fight  unemployment  in  the  last 
decade.  It  is  also  the  product  of  a  natural  desire  for 
increased  leisure  in  the  face  of  rising  income  levels. 
This  latter  tendency  would  be  expected to  continue  if it 
was  not  for  the  impact  of  the  "greying"  of  the  European 
population  and  the  strains  this  fact  imposes  on  social 
security  systems.  In  this  context,  one  expects  to  see, 
and  indeed  can  already  observe  in  some  countries  (e.g. 
the  US),  a  reversal  of  the  trend  toward  early  retirement 
accompanied  by  greater  individual  freedom  in  choosing 
one's  retirement  date.  We  thus  think  it likely  that  the 
decline  in  participation of  older  workers  will  come  to  a 
halt. 
Finally,  it is  worthwhile  noting  that  the  stability 
in  aggregate  participation  rates  hides  two  conflicting 
trends  for  men  and  women.  Women's  participation has  been 
on  the  rise  (from  45.3'  in  1975  to  50%  in  1986  for  the 
EUR1212)  as  documented  in  Table  3.  One  notices  the  wide 
disparity  across  countries  with  female  participation 
rates  in  1986  as  low  as  34'  in  Spain  and  as  high  as  78' 
in  Denmark.  By  comparison  with  the  latter,  or  even  with 
participation rates  in the  US  (64.9%  in  1986)  or  in Japan 
14.  Le  march6  du travail dans  la Communaut6,  see footnote  12 - 16-
(57.4%  in  1986),  there  is  still  a  large  unexploited 
potential  labour  force  in  the  EC  countries.  This  is 
especially  the  case  in  Southern  Europe,  but  is  equally 
true  for  member  countries  in  Central  Europe.  It  is  on 
this  front  that  the  most  significant  evolution  may 
appear.  Another  5  point  increase  in  female  participation 
rates  in  the  EC  (from  50%  to  55%)  over  the  next  decade 
would  correspond  to  5  million  new  entrants  into  the 
labour force.  The  key  issue here  is not  only  whether  such 
a  development  will  materialize  or  not,  but  also,  if it 
does,  whether  it  will  take  the  form  of  an  exogenous 
cultural  and  social  evolution  to  which  labour  markets 
will  have  to  adapt  or  rather  it  occurs  as  an 
(appropriate)  response  to tensions  arising  from  increases 
in the  demand  for  labour. 
3.4  Summary  and policy implications 
From  this  discussion,  we  might  highlight  three 
important  facts  and take  note  of  two  major  uncertainties. 
On  one  side  the  future  development  of  the  population  is 
already  determined  by  past  fertility  rates.  From  this  we 
know  that the population  of working  age  will  stabilize as 
a  proportion  of  the  total  population,  that  ft  will  be 
getting  older  on  average,  and  that  it  will  have  to 
provide  for  an  increasing  number  of  elderly  people.  The 
effects  of  the  ageing  of  the  workforce  cannot  be 
described with precision,  but  are generally thought  to be 
mostly  unfavourable  in  terms  of  a  reduction  in  dynamism, 
entrepreneurial spirit and the  willingness to take risks. 
The  increasing  number  of  people  beyond  retirement  age -17-
could also  create  financing  problems  for  social  security 
plans  in  some  countries  and,  more  generally,  will  impose 
a  rising  tax  burden  on  the  working  population  that  will 
be  only  partially  offset  by  the  reduced  proportion  of 
children in the population. 
On  the  other  side,  immigration  flows  are  difficult 
to predict  at  the  moment,  and it is equally difficult to 
say  if  (and  how)  the  potentially  large  increase  in  the 
workforce  that  would  result  from  further  increases  in 
female  participation  will  materialize.  Yet  with  the  flow 
of  young  new  entrants  set  to  fall  one  of  the  major 
challenges  the  European  economies  have  faced 
unsuccessfully  the  problem  of  youth  unemployment-
should. not  repeat  itself.  In  our  view  the  most  likely 
scenario  is  one  where  the  main  task  for  the  European 
economies  will  not  be  one  of  absorbing  a  large  number  of 
new  entrants  to  the  labour  force  but  rather  one  of 
finding  ways  to minimize  the  increasing burden  imposed  on 
the working population by the non-participants. 
As  we  have  already  observed,  changing  birth  rates 
would have  no  influence  on  the  workforce  over  the horizon 
we  are  considering  (20  years).  This  should  not  however 
prevent  us  from  thinking  about  the  very  long  run.  In 
principle  one  could devise  taxes  and  other  incentives  in 
order to  raise  the birth rate  and  ultimately  in  the  face 
of  the  long-run  prospect  of  a  quickly  ageing  and 
decreasing  European  population  we  may  have  no  choice.  We 
do  not  want  to  engage  here  in  a  debate  over  the 
effectiveness  of  pro-natalist  policies13.  Let  us  simply 
15.  See,  e.g., J. Morea,  Lea  facteurs 6conomiques  de  la f6condit6 et 
les motivations l  la parent6,  Etudes d6moqraphiques,  3,  Conaeil de -18-
note  that  equity  and  efficiency  considerations  may 
converge  in providing  support  for policy measures  tending 
to  minimize  the  adverse  financial  consequences  of  having 
and  raising  children.  This  means  increased  public 
subsidisation of day-care  centres  and  the  like as  well  as 
appropriate  design  of  income  tax  systems.  There  is  no 
reason,  however,  why  this  needs  to  be  initiated  at  a 
supra-national level. 
Of  more  immediate  importance  is  the  possibility  of 
intervention  in order to  increase participation rates.  We 
believe pursuing this  objective is  justified in the  light 
of  the  rising  number  of  people  aged  65  and  over.  Indeed, 
education,  health  expenses  and  unfunded  retirement 
allowances  for  the old are,  in all  EC  countries,  at least 
partially  financed  from  the  proceeds  of  distortionary 
taxes14.  The  weight  of  these distortions  is bound  to rise 
unless  the  burden  is  spread  among  a  larger  number  of 
active  workers,  via  an  increase  in  the  participation 
rates  of  the  working  age  population  (or  in  immigration 
flows) •  In  other  words,  the  practice  of  financing 
expenditures  on,  and  transfers  to,  the  non-working 
population  through  progressive  taxation  of  those  in  work 
confers  a  public  good  attribute  on  the  decision  to  enter 
the  labour  force,  and that attribute  should be  taken  into 
account  in the design of the social security system. 
In  light  of  our  previous  discussion,  this  principle 
!'Europe,  1979,  or,  c.  H6hn  and R.  Hackensen,  ed.,  Dete~inants of 
Fertility Trends:  Theories Be-examined,  Ordina editions,  1982 
16.  This  logic fails in the case of fully funded pension plans or 
unfunded schemes  where  workers'  contributions correspond to the 
benefits they will receive when  they themselves  retire.  This may  be 
the case if the population of retirees is a  constant fraction of the 
working population. - 19-
is  especially  relevant  in  the  case  of  women  and  older 
workers.  Its  application  strengthens  our  call  for 
removing  the  financial  and  practical  penalties  often 
confronting  women  with  children  when  they  want  to  work. 
In  the  case  of  older  people,  this  means  that  the  trend 
towards  earlier  retirement,  although  it may  be  viewed  as 
an  intrinsically  desirable  social  objective,  should  not 
be encouraged further by the authorities. 
In  fact  the  discussion  in  section  2  raises  doubts 
about  the  wisdom  of legislating on  this issue.  There  does 
not  seem  to  be  any  reason  for  the  government  to  take  a 
major  role  in  dictating  the  choice  of  an  individual's 
retirement date.  Instead the  choice  of retiring should be 
largely  a  matter  of  individual  taste,  taking  account  of 
the  (private  and  social)  opportunity  cost  of  not  working 
and  so  forth.  Greater  individualisation  of  the  decision 
to  retire  would  permit  the  expression  of  different 
individual  preferences  for  leisurelS.  However,  to  take 
account  of  the  public  good  nature  of  the  decision  to 
participate  and  the  possibilities  offered  by  improving 
health levels  and  lengthening  life expectancy,  individual 
choices  ought  to  be  guided  towards  later  retirement  by 
introducing  appropriate  incentives  into  social  security 
payment  schedules.  A  fortiori,  governments  should  resist 
the  calls,  made  on  social  grounds,  for  retirement 
schedules tilted in favour  of earlier retirement. 
4.  More  skills required 
17.  This greater flexibility should,  however,  also extend to firme 
who  would be  allowed to specify retirement dates in labour contracts 
so as to ensure an  adequate turnover of staff whose  skills might be 
short lived. -20-
In the  last section,  we  focused  our  attention  on  the 
likely  trends  in  the  overal  size  of  the  European  labour 
force.  We  now  address  the  complementary  question  of  the 
quality  of  that  labour  giving  special  attention  to  the 
likely development  of  the  relative  demand  for  skilled and 
unskilled labour in the EC. 
A  common  view  is  that  Europe's  unemployment  problem 
is,  to  a  significant  degree,  the  result  of  a  structural 
mismatch  between  the  supply of,  and  demand  for,  different 
skill  types.  This  has  resulted  from  changes  in  both 
technology  and  the  international  pattern  of  competition. 
In  particular,  advances  in  robotics,  the  information 
technology  revolution,  etc.,  have  reduced  the  need  for 
unskilled  labour  in  many  branches  of  industry  and 
simultaneously  raised  the  demand  for  certain  types  of 
skilled labour. 
Similarly  the  emergence  of  the  NICs  and  other 
developing  economies,  with their access  to large pools  of 
cheap,  unskilled  labour,  has  eroded  the  competitive 
position  of  the  traditional  heavy  and  mass  production 
industries  in  which  Europe  used  to  have  a  comparative 
advantage.  Again,  the  consequences  is  a  fall  in  the 
(relative)  demand  for unskilled labour. 
We  first  assess  the  validity  of  the  view  that  there 
has  been  a  structural  break  in  the  relative  demand  for 
skilled  and  unskilled  labour,  then  derive  its 
implications  on  the evolution of  wage  differentials.  This 
analysis  leads  us  to  recommend  an  extension  of  adult,  and 
vocational education  (section 5). (4) 
-21-
·A  first  observation  in 
break"  hypothesis  is  that 
favour  of  the 
the  highest 
"structural 
levels  of 
unemployment  over  the  last  decade  have  been  concentrated 
amongst  the unskilled.  The  ratio of the  unemployment  rate 
for  males  with  schooling  to  only  a  lower  secondary  level 
to  the  unemployment  rate  for  those  with  higher  education 
has,  in  many  countries,  risen  in  the  seventies  while  it 
has stabilized at a  high level  in others.  In  1988,  it was 
as  high  as  4. 8  in  Germany  and  4  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
for  instancel&.  Thus  while  unemployment  rates  for  all 
categories  of  workers  rose,  those  for  unskilled  and 
poorly  educated  workers  have  been  especially  high,  so 
that,  in  absolute  terms,  the  rise  in  unemployment  has 
tended  to  be  especially  concentrated  amongst  the 
unskilled. 
By  itself  this  observation  is  not  significant,  for 
at  least  three  reasons:  the  presence  of  labour  hoarding; 
the  "ladder"  effect;  and  shifts  in  the  structure  of 
wages.  Labour  hoarding matters  because it is likely  that 
in  the  face  of  significant  hiring  and  training costs  for 
skilled  labour,  firms  will  be  more  likely  to  choose  to· 
hoard  skilled  labour  than  unskilled  labour  during 
temporary  downturns  in  activity.  Consequently  cyclical 
unemployment  will be concentrated amongst  the unskilled. 
The  "ladder"  effect  works  as  follows.  Consider  a 
fall  in  labour  demand  that  affects  all  categories  of 
labour  equally,  at  the  existing  wage  rates.  Initially 
there  will  be  an  equal  rise  in  unemployment  at all skill 
levels.  However,  those  who  become  unemployed  at  the  top 
18.  Economic  outlook,  OECD,  1989 -22-
of  the  skill  distribution  may  then  end  up  accepting 
slightly less  skilled  jobs,  thus  displacing,  at  unchanged 
wage  rates,  workers  in  this  lower  skill  bracket.  They 
then  replace  workers  yet  further  down  the  skill  "ladder" 
and  so  on.  Finally  the  people  who  enter  the  pool  of 
relatively  long-lived  unemployment  are  at  the  bottom  of 
the  skill  distribution,  even  though  the  initial  shock  to 
labour  demand  was  evenly distributed throughout  the skill 
ladder.  If  the  initial  shock  were  reversed  then  workers 
would  be  sucked  back  up  the  skills  ladder,  with  the 
poorly  skilled  unemployed  getting  jobs  at  the  bottom  of 
the distribution. 
Both of these are essentially cyclical phenomena, which will disappear 
as unemployment falls. However, there is a more fundamental difficulty 
in trying to assess whether there has been an exogenous technological 
shift in favour of skilled labour from movements in the skill structure of 
unemployment alone because this is also affected by movements in the 
relative cost of skilled and unskilled labour. Thus a  semi-permanent 
increase in the relative importance of unskilled unemployment may 
reflect an exogenous narrowing of the wage differential between skilled 
and  unskilled  workers,  rather  than  any  exogenous  technological 
developments. Conversely changes in technology may not be reflected in 
the  structure  of  unemployment  if  they  are  accompanied  by 
appropriately  offsetting  movements  in wage  diflferentials.  For  this 
reason it is not appropriate to look at the behaviour of survey data on 
shortages of skilled labour either. 
For this reason, it is more instructive to look at the joint evolution of 
employment  and  wages  of different  sorts  of labour.  Unfortunately 
internationally  comparable  data  on  these  variables  is  not  readily 
available for many countries. Figure I, however, reports some evidence 
drawn from the UK General Household Survey. On the vertical axis is 
the ratio of the average wage for those with a graduate qualification to 
that for those with no formal schooling qualifications whatsoever, while 
on the horizontal is the ratio of employment of the sorts of labour. 
Between  1974  and  1979  (both  business  cycle  peaks)  there  is  an 
apparent  inverse  relationship  between  the  two,  consistent  with -23-
substitution  away  from  uualdJJed  labour  due  to  reduced  wage 
differentials.  However,  in the  early  eighties  there  is  an apparent 
outward  shift  in  the  relationship  consistent  with  there  being  a 
technological shift in favour of an increased demand for akilled labour 
relative to that for unskilled labour. 
Although it is not  easy  to  repeat  this exercise  for 
all  EC  countries,  Table  4  confirms  the  general  picture 
for  Germany  at  least.  This  gives  an  indicator  of  the 
educational  level  of  the  workforce  by  broad  industrial 
sector,  together  with  the  change  in  the  share  in  total 
employment  of  that  industry,  for  Germany  as  well  as  the 
United  Kingdom.  While  the  relationship  is  by  no  means 
perfect,  there  is  a  distinct  tendency  for  (relative) 
employment  growth  to  be  concentrated  in  industries  where 
the educational  level of the workforce  is relatively high 
(Financial  and  Other  Services) •  While  the  existence  of 
on-the-job training,  etc.,  means  that there is not  a  one-
to-one  correspondence  between  skill  levels  and  the 
duration  of  education,  the  table  is  certainly  highly 
suggestive. 
All  in all,  we  are  inclined to  agree  that  there  has 
been  a  structural  shift  in  the  relative  demand  for 
skilled  and  unskilled  labour.  Furthermore,  we  see  no 
obvious  reason  why  the  trend  towards  an  increased 
relative  demand  for  skilled labour  should  reverse  or even 
slacken  in  the  future.  Of  course,  as  noted  above  this 
need  not  be  associated  with  a  rise  in  the  unemployment 
rate  of  unskilled  labour  if it is  accompanied  by  a  fall 
in  the  cost  of  that  labour.  Previous  reports  of  this 
group  have  called  attention  to  the  need  for  greater 
differentials  in  labour costs,  both regionally  and across -24-
occupations  if  unemployment  is  to  be  kept  at  acceptable 
levels.  In  practice  incomes  policies,  minimum  wage 
legislation,  the  financing  of  social  security,  and  the 
activities  of  trade  unions  all.  seem  to  have  acted  to 
squeeze  differentials  since the  start  of  the  seventies17, 
a  trend that might  continue  under  some  peoples'conception 
of the  "social dimension"  of the Single Market. 
In  this  regard,  a  comparison  with  the  United  States 
since  the  start  of  the  decade  is  instructive.  There, 
strong  output  growth  has  been  achieved  through  sustained 
employment  growth  made  possible  by  a  wide,  and  possibly 
widening,  wage  distribution.  In  the  European  Community, 
by contrast,  most  of the  output  growth  of this period has 
been  associated with productivity  growth  achieved through 
the  substitution  of  capital  for  labour  and  a  low  degree 
of  relative  wage  flexibility.  While  Americans  may  envy 
the  Europeans  their  productivity  performance,  it  is 
rather  the  American  employment  "miracle"  that  should  be 
envied.  For  while  productivity  growth  through  capital 
deepening  is  entirely  desirable  in  the  presence  of  full 
employment,  when  there  are unutilised resources  of  labour 
it is wasteful. 
This  suggests  that  it is  important  for  policymakers 
not to put  new  obstacles  in the  way  of  increased relative 
wage  flexibility,  as  well  as  removing  existing  ones.  In 
the  short  run  this  will  help  to·  ensure  the  full 
employment  of  low  quality  labour.  These  considerations 
then  imply  that,  unless  adequate  changes  take  place  on 
the  supply  side,  one  will  observe  an  increasing degree  of 
19.  See  the Employment  outlook,  OECD,  September  1987 -25-
income  inequality  between  skilled  and  unskilled  workers. 
Such  a  development  would,  however,  probably  be  seen  to be 
inequitable  and  could  well  provoke  measures  - such  as  a 
strengthening  of  minimum  wage  legislation  - to  prevent 
it.  While  this  might  help  to  maintain  the  incomes  of 
those  in  work  it  would  however  inevitably  lead  to 
increased  unemployment  amongst  the  unskilled  and  a 
progressive  marginalization  of  some  sectors  of  the 
workforce.  It  is  much  better  to  confront 'this  problem 
through  the  tax  and  social  security  systems,  while 
simultaneously  seeking  to  raise  the  skill  levels  of  the 
workforce.  Such  a  policy would  lead to  an  increase  in the 
quantity  of  skilled  and  a  decrease  in  the  quantity  of 
unskilled  labour.  Furthermore,  greater  wage  dispersion 
will  help  to  provide  the  necessary  market  incentives  to 
encourage  workers to acquire the appropriate skills. 
5.  Developing education in Europe 
This naturally  leads  us  to the  issue of training and 
education  and  the  role  of  the  public  sector  therein, 
whether  at  the  national  or  supra-national  level.  I.t  is 
useful  to start by  listing the difficulties confronting  a 
purely  private  system  of  education  and  training.  First, 
the  principal  beneficiary  of  an  educated  workforce 
private  firms- cannot  be  relied  upon  to  provide  the 
socially  optimal  amount  of  education.  This  is due  to  the 
fact  that  individual  firms  cannot  be  sure  that  the 
returns  to  any  investment  in  the  (non-firm  specific) 
skills of  their workforce  will  accrue  to  them.  Education -26-
and  training  are  classic  public  goods.This  does  not  mean 
that  a  substantial  amount  of  employer-financed  training 
and  education  programs  does  not  take  place;  only  that 
these  cannot  be  relied upon  to  constitute  the  core  of  an 
education  system18. 
On  the  demand  side,  several  issues  limit  the 
prospects  for  a  pure  market-driven  solution  to  the 
problem of providing an  adequate  supply  of skills.  To  see 
this,  suppose  initially  that  there  is  no  discrepancy 
between  the  social  and  the  private  return  to  education. 
Then  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  this  return 
cannot  be  fully  appropriated  by  the  student  or  the 
trainee.  Any  problems  now  arise on  the  financing  front. 
Think  of  a  private  institution  (a  bank  or  an 
insurance  company)  being  sollicited  for  a  student  loan. 
First,  it  will  find  it  extremely  difficult  to  evaluate 
the  intrinsic  default  risk  of  lending  to  a  particular 
individual19.  Second,  the  bank  may  experience  substantial 
difficulties  in  collecting  repayment  of  the  debt. 
Experience  in the  US  and  Canada  suggests that the default 
rate  on  privately-provided  student  loans  is  as  high  as 
10%  or  more20.  Because  of  these  information  and  incentive 
problems,  one  observes  banks  and  similar  private 
institutions  being  excessively  cautious  in  lending  to 
18.  Note,  in anticipation of the next  section,  that this non-
appropriability problem is the more  acute the higher the degree of 
labour mobility. 
19.  The  default risk could furthermore  be altered by the effect of 
the  te~  of the loan contract on  the conscientiousness of the 
student:  he may  be  lead to  choose excessively risky programs of 
studies or to decrease his overall effort level  (there is thus  a 
"moral hazard"  problem). 
20.  Tod-up  loans  for Students,  Annex c,  H.H.  Government  CH.520,  1988. 
The  corresponding figure  fo~ government-financed schemes  is only 1-
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prospective students. 
Furthermore  the  financing  of  education  should 
contain  an  element  of  insurance.  Some  1ndividuals  will 
simply  be  unlucky  in  ending-up  in  low-paying  jobs,  and 
this possibility may  reduce their willingness to train in 
the  first  place.  A  well-functioning  private  insurance 
market  for,- such  risks  is,  however,  unlikely,  not  only 
because  of  the  collection difficulties already mentioned, 
but  also  because  actuarially  fair  insurance  rates  might 
discourage  the  best  risks,  i.e.  the  students  most  likely 
to  complete  their  studies  and  obtain  a  good  job 
thereafter  (there is an  "adverse selection" problem). 
It  is  time  now  to  drop  the  assumption  that  the 
social  and private  return to education  are  identical,  for 
the  acquisition  of  knowledge  generally  confer:s 
significant  benefits  on  society  as  a  whole.  The  social 
value  of  knowledge  extends  beyond  the  specific  skills 
which are  of direct value  to the  employer  and  any  private 
benefits  enjoyed  by  the graduate.  These  external benefits 
are  greater  the  less  specific  the  type  of  education,  so 
that  primary,  secondary  and  tertiary  education  creates 
more  externalities than vocational training. 
For  all  these  reasons  a  fully  private  solution  to 
the  problem  of  financing  education  is  not  practicable. 
Instead  we  recommend  a  publicly-funded  student  loan 
scheme  coupled  with  a  "graduate  tax"  which  links  the size 
of  the  loan  repayment  to  postgraduate  income  and  is 
collected  as  an  income  tax  surcharge.  This  would  both 
minimize  default  rates  and  permit  some  degree  of 
insurance.  Because  of  the public  good nature of education -28-
and  the  adverse  selection  problem,  repayment  rates  would 
not  be  actuarially fair  and  the  system  would  thus  not  be 
self-financing. 
Finally,  the  output  of  the  education  system  is  not 
limited  to  the  transmission  of  knowledge  between 
individuals  and  generations,  but  also  extends  to  the 
production  of  new  knowledge,  a  clear  public  good. 
Fundamental  research  in  all  scientific  and  human 
disciplines  has  to  be  publicly  funded.  This  is  well 
recognized and need not be elaborated further. 
Our  purpose  here  is  not  to  propose  a  fundamental 
revision  of  the  existing  secondary  and  higher  education 
systems  of  the  Community  (although  the  above  principles 
should  guide  their  continued  development) •  Rather  the 
"greying"  of  the  working  population,  continued 
technological  change  and  the  necessity  of  systematically 
improving  the  skills of  the  Community's  labour  force  are 
reasons  for  encouraging  a  sizable  expansion  in  adult 
education:  retraining  programs,  continuing  or  recurrent 
education,  etc.  Exactly  the  same  principles  apply  to  the 
development  of  these activities as  operate  in the  case  of 
higher  education.  One  thus  faces  the  issue  of  how  to 
finance  this  expansion  in  adult  education.  A  fully 
market-driven  solution  is  again  impractical.  We  recommend 
the  introduction  of  a  program  of  "adult-student"  loans 
programs  organized  locally  or  nationally  and  designed 
after the  model  above.  Again  such  a  program  would  not  be 
entirely  self-financing  notably  because  of  the  public 
good nature of education. 
Admittedly,  the  problems  we  have  identified  above (S) 
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might  be  less  acute  in the  case  of  adult  education.  This 
is  because,  firstly,  adults  will  probably  have 
accumulated  some  savings  and  thus  be  less  dependent  on 
outside  financing,  and,  secondly,  adult  education  is 
likely to  be  more  job-specific  and  have  less  of  a  public 
good  component  than  general  education.  However,  there are 
other  considerations,  in  particular  the  fixed  cost 
associated with the decision of quitting the  labour  force 
and  taking  study  leave,  which  suggest  that,  in  the 
absence  of  appropriate  incentives,  investment  in 
retraining and continuing education will be too  low. 
Note  that  while  we  believe  that  there  is  a  major 
role  for  the  public  sector  in  financing  education,  we 
have  not  argued  that  it  must  be  publicly  produced. 
Indeed,  even  though public education  systems  are  the rule 
in  the  EC  countries,  a  well-designed  system  coupling 
private  production  with  public  subsidies  might  function 
just  as  well.  Indeed  competition  in  the  supply  of 
education  would  encourage  greater  efficiency.  The  large 
number  of  students  (and  thus  the  cost  of  administering  a 
program  of  subsidies)  and  the  public  good  nature  of 
general  education  may  perhaps  justify  it  being  provided 
by  the  state21.  These  obstacles  are  much  less  significant 
in  the  case  of  adult  education.  Thus,  while  the  public 
authorities  have  a  major  role  to  play  in  financing  adult 
and  continuing  education,  as  well  as  in  quality  control 
and  certification,  the  development  of  such  facilities 
within  the  Community  should  also  leave  room  for  private 
21.  The  creation of the Single Market  is also likely to foster 
competition and thus greater efficiency between state-run higher 
education systems  (see below). -30-
institutions.  This  requires  that  public  and  private 
institutions in the field of adult  education  compete  on  a 
level playing field in the  sense  of both  being  subject  to 
the  same  regulations  and  economic  conditions.  Any 
subsidisation  is  thus  best  administered  on  the  demand 
rather than the supply side of the market. 
Should  public  intervention  in  education  such  as  an 
increased  supply  of  loans  and  the  associated  graduate 
tax,  and  the  funding  of  fundamental  research,  be 
organised  at  the  Community  level  or  at  the  national 
level?  Following  section  2,  there  is  at  least  some  case 
for  Community  involvement.  International  labour  mobility 
implies  that  the  returns  to  investment  in  educating  the 
workforce  cannot  be  fully  appropriated  by  the  country 
that  finances  it.  At  the  same  time,  student  mobility 
within  the  Community  opens  the  possibility  of  countries 
"free  riding"  in  the  provision  of  education:  "Let  our 
neighbours  bear the  cost of educating  our  workforce".  The 
former  problem  would  justify  the  provision  of  subsidies 
from  the  Community  to  counteract  the  tendency  it  induces 
for  underprovision  of  education  and  training  by 
individual  countries.  The  latter  could  be  tackled  by 
requiring transfers  between  member  countries,  computed  on 
the basis  of the net  flows  of  students  and  the  (marginal) 
cost of education. 
However,  the  significance  of  these  problems  should 
not  be  overestimated.  Natural  impediments  to  worker 
mobility  (see  the  section  6)  are  likely  to  make  the 
. 
leakages  from  national  investment  in  education  rather 
small.  Moreover,  nationals  of  one  country  also  benefit - 31-
from  the  expansion  and diffusion of their culture  when  it 
is  carried  abroad  by  educated  migrants.  Finally,  a 
successful  higher  education  system  gen~rates  important 
positive  externalities  that  are  likely  to  outweigh  the 
benefits  of  a  policy  of  free  riding.  Thus  we  do  not 
believe  there  is  a  compelling  case  for  Community 
intervention of the type described above. 
This  is  not  to  deny  that  there  may  be  a  role  for 
Community  action  in  education.  On  the  contrary  we 
strongly  approve  of  the  current  measures  encouraging 
mobility  amongst  students  and  researchers.  These  actions 
should  be  extended  and  reinforced  with  the  aim  of 
promoting  the  emergence  of  a  truly  European  system  of 
higher  education.  That  is,  a  system  where,  across  the 
Community  competition  between  universities  and  otqer 
institutions  of  further  education  pushes  them  to  exploit 
their  comparative  advantages,  and  where  students  (young 
or adult)  can choose  where  to  study  on  the basis  of their 
assessment  of the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of the various 
institutions.  Improvements  in  the  coordination  of 
research  activities  and  in  the  flow  of  information  are 
also  called  for.  While  language  differences  will 
inevitably  retard  progress  in  these  areas,  the  potential 
gains  from  the better  exploitation  of  the  rich  diversity 
of  existing  institutions  of  higher  learning  make  the 
effort  worthwhile.  Programs  such  as  the  Community's 
ERASMUS  project  have  an  important  part  to  play  in  this 
effort. 
6.  Towards  more mobilitv -32-
One  cannot  discuss  the  future  of  labour  markets  in 
Europe,  without  also  addressing  the  implications  of  the 
increased  worker  (and  firm)  mobility  that  is  likely  to 
follow  from  the  completion  of the  Single Market.  We  start 
by  reviewing  the  costs  and  benefits  of  increased  labour 
mobility  and  then  examine  two  of  the  major  obstacles  on 
the  road towards  more  mobility. 
6.1  The  benefits of mobility 
Is  increased  labour  mobility  necessary  to  reap  the 
full  gains  from  the  1992  program?  In  theory,  the  answer 
is  no,  for  the  free  mobility  of  goods  and  capital  alone 
ought  to  be  sufficient  to  achieve  the  equalization  of 
factor  returns  and  the efficient allocation  of production 
and  consumption.  No  further  gains  can  be  expected  from 
the relocation of workers. 
In  support  of  this  theoretical  view  some  have 
pointed  out  to  the  convergence  of  hourly  wages  that  has 
occurred  in  the  last  decade  in  Northern  Europe,  as 
reflected  in  Figure  II.  The  same  conclusion  can  be  drawn 
from  the  data  in  Table  6  which  suggests  that  wage 
differences  in the  "Northern"  part  of the  EC  have  more  to 
do  with  wage  differences  between  regions  and  industries 
within  a  country than with differences between countries. 
This  evidence  is  however  partial  as  it  does  not 
cover  all  member  countries.  More  importantly,  it  is 
limited  to  prices  (wage  levels)  which,  in  a  period  of 
significant  unemployment,  tell  a  very  incomplete  story. 
Furthermore  this  evidence  rev~als  that  even  within -33-
individual  countries  where  capital  and  goods  mobility  is 
as  high  as  one  can  expect,  wage  equalisation  does  not 
generally  materialize.  Other  more  telling  examples  (the 
U.K.  or  Italy}  of  sizable  wage,  productivity  and 
unemployment  differences  within  a  country  could be  chosen 
to illustrate this point. 
This  reality  which  can  be  explained  by  the  presence 
of  indivisibilities,  returns  to  scale,  frictions  of  all 
kinds  supports  the  layman's  view  that  there  are 
unquestionable  static  efficiency  gains  to  be  expected 
from  an  increased  degree  of  mobility  in  Europe.  These 
gains  would  result  from  an  improved  match  between  the 
supply  and  demand  of  labour  at  the  continental  scale, 
both in quantity and in quality. 
This  does  not  mean  we  either  foresee  or  favour  the 
relocation  of  masses  of  workers.  Only  a  relatively  small 
number  of  people  whose  skills  are  scarcer  in  another 
region  or  in  (temporary)  oversupply  in  their  own  are 
likely to be  involved. 
One  should  not  rely  only  on  labour  mobility  to 
achieve  these  efficiency gains.  Worker  relocation entails 
significant 
mobility  of 
personal 
capital 
costs 
may  be 
and,  to 
a  better 
a  large  extent, 
substitute.  The 
relevant  question  is  whether  the  choice  between  the  two 
alternatives  - capital moving  to  labour  or  labour  moving 
to  capital- involves  any  additional  social  costs  or 
benefits.  We  believe  these  are  likely to  be  minimal.  The 
location  decision  for  a  firm,  or  its  subsidiary,  is 
complex,  entailing  a  large  number  ·of  variables  and 
parameters.  Yet,  the  private  costs  of  relocation  should -34-
be  adequately  reflected  in  the  wage  premium  necessary  to 
attract  foreign  workers  and  induce  them  to  leave  their 
country.  And  a  firm  will  naturally  compare  these  extra 
wage  costs  against  those  of  setting up  a  production plant 
where  the  pool  of  skills  is  available,  i.e.  displacing 
the capital and,  probably,  some  of the management22. 
The  possibility  of  an  inefficient  allocation  of 
managerial  expertise  resulting  from  tax  differences 
between  countries  cannot  be  totally  discounted  however. 
In  time  this  would  lead  to  pressure  to  reduce  tax  rates 
and  a  more  efficient  international  distribution  of  tax 
burdens.  However  the  cost  of  this  competitive  process 
could  be  substantial  and  there  are  good  reasons  to  try 
avoiding  them  altogether  by  anticipating  the  necessary 
coordination  of  national  tax  codes,  and  thus  eliminating 
the inefficiencies that would motivate these relocations. 
This  dynamic  viewpoint  raises  another  important 
question.  Increased  worker  mobility  is unambiguously  good 
for  a  firm  if  it  implies  access  to  a  larger  pool  of 
workers  with  the  appropriate  skills.  It  is  not  so  good, 
however,  when  it means  an  increased probability of  losing 
its  own  workers  (and  the  investment  made  in  their 
training  and  education)  to  competitors  •  In  other  words, 
worker  mobility  exacerbates  the  problem  of  the  non-
appropriability  of  a  firm's  investment  in  human  capital, 
and  the  consequent  tendency  for  under  investment, 
discussed  in  section  5.  There  could  thus  be  too  much 
mobility in principle. 
22.  This  argument  does  not  rule out the existence of "thick market" 
externalities  justifying public intervention  (e.g.,  in the  fo~ of 
infrastructure investment)  to induce  fir.ms  to locate optimally. -35-
In reality,  we  do  not  think the  problem is acute.  On 
the one  hand,  the basic tendency  to underinvest  in skills 
can  be  effectively  countered  by  public  actions  targetted 
at  the  individuals  who  would  benefit  from  additional 
training  as  outlined  above.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
multiplicity  of  languages  and  cultures  in  Europe  is  a 
substantial  barrier  to  mobility  that  makes  it  highly 
unlikely that  the point of excessive  international  labour 
mobility  will  be  reached.  It  follows  that  continued 
efforts  should  be  made  to  remove  obstacles  to  the 
mobility  of  European  workers.  This  has  implications  for 
the  international  coordination of  social  security,  health 
and  tax  systems.  We  illustrate  the  issues  by  addressing 
in turn the  problems  raised by  unemployment  insurance  and 
pension plans. 
6.2  Unemplovment  insurance  and mobilitv 
Why  should  there  be  any  unemployment  insurance  in 
the  first  place?  Aside  from  equity  considerations,  there 
is  a  straight  insurance  argument  that  workers,  especially 
those  with  firm  or  occupation  specific  skills,  should  be 
compensated  if  they  are  unlucky  enough  to  lose  their 
jobs,  in  return  for  paying  an  insurance  premium  when  they 
are in  work.  It might  seem that  the  most  desirable  scheme 
would  then  simply  involve  a  lump-sum  payment  when  a 
worker  loses  his  job  in  order  not  to  discourage  him  from 
finding  a  new  job quickly. 
However,  there  are  at  least  two  reasons  why  this 
might  not  be  best.  First,  unemployed  workers  will  differ 
in their ability to  find  work  and  the  scheme  needs  to  be -36-
tailored  so  as  to  give  greater  compensation  to  those  who 
will  naturally  experience  more  difficulty  in  finding  a 
job.  Second,  the  process  of  matching  unemployed  workers 
to  unfilled  vacancies  involves  an  externality.  When  a 
worker  decides  to  search  for  work  he  raises  the 
likelihood of  firms  being  able  to  make  a  good  match.  The 
private  calculus  of  whether  to  accept  a  job  offer  or 
continue  searching  ignores  this,  and  thus  time  spent 
searching  for  a  good  match  will  generally  be  too  low. 
Conventional  unemployment  benefit  paid  out  periodically 
can correct this inefficiency23. 
Table  5  documents  the  key  features  of  the  level  and 
duration  of  unemployment  benefits  across  the  European 
Community,  as  well  as  some  other  countries.  As  can  be 
seen  there  are  marked  variations  across  countries.  How 
important  are  these  in  explaining  international 
differences  in  unemployment  experience  and  what  can  be 
said about  optimal benefit rates? 
To  begin  with,  what  evidence  is  there  that  the 
generosity  of  unemployment  benefits  played  a  significant 
role  in  the  rise  in  European  unemployment  in  the  last 
decade?  The  answer is not  clear.  In  theory  high  levels  of 
unemployment  benefits  discourage  the  taking  of  lowly-paid 
jobs  and  prolong  search  activity  by  workers.  They  also 
make  employed  workers  more  willing  to  risk  pricing 
themselves  out  of  a  job,  and  thus  lead  to  increased  wage 
pressure.  However,  a  large  number  of  empirical  studies, 
21.  There  is also a  countervailing externality.  When  a  worker 
searches he  reduces the chances  of other unemployed workers  finding  a 
job.  The  optimal level of unemployment  compensation trades off these 
two externalities.  See  C.  Pissarides,  Unemployment  and Vacancies  in 
Britain,  Economic  Policy,  3,  1986. (6) 
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at both  an  aggregate  level  and  using  individual data have 
failed  to  isolate  quantitatively  strong  effects  from 
benefits  onto  wages.  Given  that  replacement  ratios  did 
not  rise  dramatically  in  the  late  seventies  and  early 
eighties,  high  benefit  levels  cannot  be  singled  out  as 
the culprit for the recent rise in European  unemployment. 
There  is  however  evidence  to  suggest  that  the 
structure  of  unemployment  benefits  does  have  significant 
effects  on  the  persistence  of  unemployment.  Cross-country 
studies  suggest  that  even  if  differences  in  average 
unemployment  levels  are  not  strongly  related  to  existing 
benefit  levels,  there  is  a  relationship  between  the 
benefit  system  and  the  persistence  of  unemployment.  In 
particular  the  duration  for  which  benefits  are  payable 
seems  to  have  an  especially  significant  effect  on 
persistence24. 
The  possibility  that  excessively  generous 
unemployment  benefits end  up  discouraging  job  search is  a 
serious  issue.  Taking  account  of  the  observation  made 
above  that  the  duration  for  which  benefits  are  payable 
appears  to  be  a  key  factor  in  generating  persistent 
unemployment,  it  seems  that  an  optimal  scheme  would 
feature  generous  benefits  for  a  relatively  short  period 
of time,  say six months. 
Is  there  any  role  for  the  Community  to  seek  to 
standardise  unemployment  insurance  schemes  across  Europe? 
Our  previous  report  advocated  introducing  a  Community 
element  into  the  funding  of  unemployment  benefits,  as 
22  See c.  Bean  and J.  Symons  "Ten Years  of Mrs.  T.", ~ 
Macroeconomics  Annual,  1989  and o.  Blanchard et al.,  World 
Imbalances,  WIDER,  1989 -38-
part  of  the  mechanism  for  redistributing  resources 
between  regions.  However,  that  was  only  a  minimal  scheme, 
which  left  individual  countries  free  to  top  it  up,  so 
that  schemes  would  still  differ  between  countries. 
Clearly  one  would  not  wish  to  enforce  the  same  absolute 
levels  of  benefits  across  countries  as  this  would  imply 
excessively  high  replacement  ratios  in  low  wage 
countries.  This  problem  could  be  avoided  by  regulating 
replacement  ratios,  i.e.,  ensuring  benefits  were  related 
to  previous  earnings  or  contributions,  rather  than 
benefit levels per se. 
Attention  must  be  also  paid  to  the  appropriate  way 
of  linking national  systems  of  unemployment  compensations 
to  foster  mobility  of  both  employed  and  unemployed 
workers.  In  principle,  an  unemployed  worker  should  be 
allowed  to  move  abroad  temporarily,  without  losing  his 
rights,  if  the  prospects  for  his  type  of  skills  are 
better  in  another  country.  This  however  raises  several 
problems. 
There  is  first  a  problem  of  control  if the  country 
of  origin  remains  responsible  for  the  payment  of  the 
unemployment  allowances  of  a  worker  residing  abroad.  It 
is  also  true  that  an  unemployed  worker  accepting  a  job 
offer  abroad  should  not  lose  any  of  his  rights  in  the 
event  he  finds  himself  unemployed  again.  However  the 
latter event  should not  be  encouraged,  which  might  be  the 
case  if  a  worker  receives  the  right  to  draw  unemployment 
compensations  from  his  new  (more  generous)  country  of 
residence  immediately  after relocating.  Finally,  there is 
also  the  possibility  of  a  particular  country  attempting -39-
to  export  its  unemployment  by  setting  excessively  low 
compensation  levels.  "Competition  between  rules"  could 
then  lead  to  the  generalisation  of  the  lowest  level  of 
unemployment  allowances  or replacement  ratios. 
This  tour  of  the  problems  shows  that  the  issue  is 
not  trivial  and  that,  although  it  does  not  seem 
reasonable  to call for the  harmonisation of  regulation  in 
this  area,  there  is  a  definite  role  for  the  Community  in 
coordinating  the  different  national  systems  and 
establishing  a  set  of  rules  to  foster  mobility.  These 
could  be  defined  along  the  following  lines.  Each  member 
country is responsible  for  the  unemployment  allowances  of 
its  nationals  until  employment  has  been  held  in  another 
country  for  a  given  period,  say  2  years.  At  that  time 
responsibility  is  transferred  to  the  country  of 
residence.  In  the  interim  period,  the  social  security 
agency  of  •  the  country  of  residence  is  in  charge  of 
monitoring  the activities of the  unemployed  and  of paying 
the  allowances  he  is  entitled  to  in  his  country  of 
origin.  These  payments  are  then  the  object  of  periodic 
clearings  between  national  social  security  agencies  • 
•  Obviously  the  specifics  of  the  proposed  linkage  between 
social  security  systems  may  differ  from  those  outlined 
above.  The  necessity  of  such  linkages  however  appears 
inescapable. 
6.3 Mobility and the deSign of pension plans 
This  is  another  complex  issue  whose  importance 
should  not  be  underestimated  if  mobility  is  not  to  be 
restricted to  workers  at  the  start of their career  or  to -40-
intra-firm  mobility.  The  "greying"  of  the  working 
population  described  earlier  makes  this  problem  all  the 
more  pressing. 
The  objective  is  simple:  pensions  should  be  made 
fully  portable  in  the  sense  that  a  worker  changing  job 
and  country  would  carry  with  him  total  credit  for  the 
retirement  contributions  accumulated  on  his  behalf.  This 
could  follow  from  a  full  legal  recognition  that 
contributions  made  to pension  funds  by  a  worker,  as  well 
as  by  his  employer,  are  nothing  other  than  deferred 
wages,  and  that  this  principle  also  applies  to 
accumulated  dues  under  an  unfunded  system  of  social 
security.  In  practice,  however,  even  assuming  this 
principle  is  fully  recognized,  differences  between 
existing  social  security  systems  will  make  its 
implementation  a  non  trivial  matter.  As  an  example,  a 
French  worker's  retirement  allowances  are  covered  mostly 
by  an  unfunded  public  social  security  scheme,  while  the 
UK  relies  more  heavily  on  funded  pension  plans 
administered  through  private  institutions.  A  British 
worker  moving  to  France  should  be  able  to  carry  with  him 
the  full  value  of  the  contributions  made  on  his  behalf 
(i.e.,  by  himself  and  by  his  employers).  He  should  then 
be  allowed  to  apply  this  sum  towards  covering  an  entry 
fee,  depending  on  his  age  and  salary,  into  the  French 
social  security  system.  Conversely,  a  French  worker 
taking  a  job  in  the  UK  should  receive  from  the  French 
authorities  either  the  capitalised  value  of  his 
accumulated  credit  toward  pension  payments  or  a  voucher 
corresponding  to  these  payments  that  would  allow  him  to -41-
apply  to  a  program  of  reduced  contributions  into his  new 
(British)  pension  fund.  Working  out  the  legal details  of 
such  linkages  is beyond  the  scope  of this  repo:tt..  Let  us 
emphasize  again  however  the  impo~tance  of  tl':ls  for 
reaping  the  full  rewards  from  the  constrution  of  the 
Single European  (Labour)  Market25. 
7.  The  formation  ~f yages26 
In  this  section,  we  •ddress  the  more  speculative 
question  of  the  impact  of  economic  integration in  Europe 
on  the  institutional  arrangements  prevailing  in  labour 
markets.  Specifically,  we  shall  focus  on  the  impact  of 
the  degree  of  centralisation  in  wage  bargaining  on  wages 
and  employment,  as  well  as  other  indicators  of 
macroeconomic  perfo~ance. 
7.1 Corporatiam or competitipp? 
Calmfors  and  Driffill27  note  that  in  some  respects 
the best  employment  performance  in  recent  years  seems  to 
have  been  registered  by  those  countries  who  either  have 
highly  centralised  wage  bargaining  structures  (Austria 
and  the  Nordic  countri~s)  and,  in  that  limited  sense, 
might  be  labelled  •corporatist",  and  those  who,  at  the 
other  extreme,  have· strongly  decentralised  labour  market 
25.  OUr  call for a  greateE  lndlvl~alisation of the choice of one's 
retirement date is alao of Eelevance here.  To  the extent that it ia 
~lemented in each  coun~ry it Eemoves  all interest in the •ctivity 
of searching for the country that per.mits taking retizement at the 
date closest to the one deelJed,  a  aourpe of inefficiencf in the 
decision to locate. 
26.  The  material in tble eectiQn and the appendix wae  developed in 
collaboration with Jennlfec •unt. 
24.  Calmfors  L.  and J. Drifflll, S.rgaining Structure,  Corporati~ 
and Macroeconomic  Performance,  Bconom£g  Pqliqy,  6,  1988 -42-
institutions  (Japan,  the u.s.,  Switzerland).  By  contrast, 
economies  falling  "in  between"  (including  most  of  the 
European  Community)  appear  to  have  performed  less 
satisfactorily.  In  short,  extremes  seem  to  work  best.  To 
illustrate  this,  Figure  III  plots  the  change  in  the 
average  unemployment  rate  between  1963-74  and  1974-8528 
for  seventeen  OECD  economies  ranked  according  to  the 
degree  of  centralisation.  The  more  centralised  (Austria 
and  the  Nordic  countries)  are  on  the  left,  while  the 
least  centralised  (Japan,  North  America)  are  on  the 
right.  There  is  indeed  some  evidence  of  a  hump-shape 
relationship. 
At  this point  we  should  acknowledge  that the notions 
of  corporatism  and  centralisation  are  somewhat  slippery. 
Some  countries,  e.g.  Australia,  may  have  institutional 
structures  which  may  outwardly  seem  quite  corporatist, 
but  in  reality  fail  to  function  in  this  manner.  Again 
some  countries  may  be  relatively  corporatist  at  some 
times  and  not  at  others  e.g.  the  United  Kingdom 
functioned  much  like  a  corporatist:  economy  during  the 
"Social  Contract"  of  1976-78  while  Germany,  usually 
classified  as  one  of  the  more  corporatist  of  the 
Community  economies,  probably  became  less  so  after  the 
mid-70's.  Centralisation  in  wage  bargaining  is  a  more 
precise  concept.  However  it  cannot  be  totally  isolated 
from  the  general  notion  of  corporatism.  As  was  pointed 
out  by  Giavazzi  ". •  a  neo-corporatist  system  is  one  in 
which unions  share  a  vision of  economic  policy similar to 
that  of  the  government,  and  try  to  enforce  it  in  the 
28.  The  conclusions here are fairly robust to minor variations in the 
sample period. -43-
labour  market.  In  order to  work,  such  a  system  needs  two 
conditions:  consensus  (the  sharing  of  objectives),  anct 
enforceability.  ( .. )  Centralisation  is  crucial  for 
enforceability,  but  C$ntralisation  withoQt  consensus  may 
not  work"29. 
While  the  concepts  are  imprecise,  there  are  good 
economic  reasons  to  expect  an  empirical  relationship  of 
the  type illustrated in Figure  III.  Most  economists  would 
be  willing  to  accept  the  notion  that  a  properly 
decentralised  competitive  economy  should  function  well, 
harnessing  as  it  does  competitive  forces  to  keep  wages 
and  prices  in  check.  At  the  other  extreme,  at  a  high 
level  of  centralisation,  wage  (and  price)  setters, 
recognizing  the  adverse  consequences  of  wage  (and  price) 
increases  on  inflation  and  unemployment,  will  naturally 
tend  to  moderate  their  demands.  That  neither  logic 
operates  in  the  "in-between"  case  would  then  help  to 
explain  why  members  of  the  European  Community  appear  to 
have  registered a  less satisfactory performance.  Freeman30 
reaches  a  similar  conclusion  by  focusing  on·  the 
correlation  between  employment  performance,  on  the  one 
hand,  and wage  dispersion and union density on the other. 
More  precisely,  the  proposition  that  the  relation 
between  centralisation  and  real  wages  is  hump-shaped  is 
founded  on  the  interplay  of  two  forces  working  in 
opposite directions.  On  the  one  hand,  as  wage  bargaining 
gets  more  centralised,  i.e.  in  the  hands  of  unions  that 
encompass  more  workers  and  employers  associations  that 
27.  Comment  on  Calmfore-D~lffill, §ponomic Policy,  6,  1988 
25.  Freeman  R.  B.,  Labour Market  Institutions and Economic 
Performance,  Economic  Policy,  6,  1988 -44-
incorporate  more  firms,  labour  unions  acquire  more  market 
power  and  are  able  to  secure  higher  wages.  At  the  same 
time,  employers  are  freer  to  absorb  wage  increases 
through  higher  prices  and  they  will  put  up  less 
resistance  to  workers'  demands  for  higher  wages.  Thus 
·increased centralisation on  the  one  hand  tends  to  lead to 
higher  wages  and  prices  and  lower  output  and  employment. 
On  the  other  hand,  at  this  higher  level  of 
centralisation,  negotiated  wage  increases  and  the 
consequent  price  rises  have  a  larger  impact  on  the 
general  price  level.  This  decreases  the  benefit  expected 
from  wage  increases  (as  it  cuts  into  the  real  value  of 
wages)  and  thus  tends  to  soften  wage  demands.  This  may 
also  stiffen  employers'  resolve  to  resist  those  demands 
as it affects the real value of their profits. 
These  ideas  have  been  formalized  for  a  closed 
economy  by  Calmfors  and Driffill.  Our  contribution here 
is to  extend their  analysis  to  a  multi-country  setting 
and  ask  how  increased  international  competition  and 
economic  integration  would  affect  the  conclusions.  The 
model  underlying  this  analysis  is  described  in  more 
detail in  an  appendix. Loosely speaking, however, it contains the 
following elements. There are two countries, each producing a range of 
products.  Increased  economic  integration,  as in  the Single  Market 
program, makes the products of  one country closer substitutes for those 
of the other. In the limit where there are no barriers to international 
trade in goods, competition is at its most intense and goods prices are 
identical across the two countries. 
In addition  wage  bargain can take place at various  levels.  The most 
decentralised case is where there is an union per firm, setting wages in 
isolation.  More  centralisation  corresponds  to  greater  co-ordination 
between unions so that in the limit it is as if  there is but one union setting 
wages for the whole economy (the Scandinavian model). Union bosses are -45-
faced with two adverse effects of higher wages.  First,  they directly 
decrease  employment  in  the  industry  (or  industries). 
Second,  higher  wages  also  lead to  a  higher  general  level 
of  prices  which  to  some  extent  offsets  the  original  wage 
increase.  The  first  effect  is  more  pronounced  when  a 
single  union  is  involved  than  when  wage  bargaining  is 
centralised.  The  second  effect  is  more  significant  when 
bargaining  is  relatively  centralised.  In  the  middle, 
however,  neither  force  may  be  stong  enough  to  restrain 
wage  demands.  Hence  the  "hump". 
7.2  Economic  integration and the bump 
The  first  question  that  must  be  raised  is 
whether  there is any  likelihood that  a  fully  integrated 
Europe  could  pursue  the  corporatist  route,  i.e.  wage 
bargaining would  become  sufficiently coordinated at the 
European  level  to  ensure  that  the  externalities  in  the 
wage  formation  process  are  internalised, and if  it is possible 
whether it would be desirable. It might seen obvious from our earlier 
discussion  that  either  some  form  of  Euro-corporatism  or  extreme 
laissez-faire are both valid models for Europe to aim at. Furthermore 
the  quasi-corporalist  nature  of existing  institutions  and  the  "social 
dimension" of the Single Market program might both be expected to 
push the Community towards the former (perhaps with a little bit of 
resistance from the UKI). But would Euro-corporatism work as well as 
the existing Austrian and Nordic models? Probably not, for in terms of 
sheer size the two would be very different. Euro-eorporatism might well 
lead to  increased pressure for  reduced  wage  differentials within the 
Community. Within a small country where regional wage differentials 
may not be  too  pronounced  this  might not matter very  much,  but 
pressure to pull the level of  wages in Sou  them Europe up to the current 
levels of the North would be a recipe for increased unemployment in the 
South. Euro-corporatism might thus well  lead to a  worsering of the 
regional problem. 
Fortunately,  however,  the  emergence  of a  Euro-corporatist  structure 
seems  to  us  rather  unlikely.  Not  only  the  size  of  the  European -46-
Community  but  also  the  economic,  cultural  and  political 
diversity  of  its  component  institutions  pteclude  the 
degree  of  centralisation  and,  most  of  all,  cohesiveness 
that  is  necessary  for  an  efficient  corporatist 
organization.  Unions  are  organised  on  craft  lines  in  the 
UK  and  industrial  lines  in  Germany  for  instance,  and  it 
is difficult  to  see  the  emergence  of  a  cohesive  European 
union  movement.  The  existing  Austrian  and  Nordic  models 
of  corporatism  have,  in  terms  of  not  only  size  but  also 
cohesiveness,  very  little  in  common  with  the  European 
Community.  Having  thus  ruled  out  the  possibility of  pan-
European  corporatism,  we  ignore  in  what  follows  the 
results obtained with full European-wide centralisation. 
A first  look at the results  suggests  the  presence of 
a  significant  interaction  between  economic  integration 
and  the  degree  of  efficiency  of  the  wage  bargaining 
structures.  Table  7  records  the  unemployment  rate  that 
obtains  in  our  stylised  two-country  world  as  the  degree 
of centralisation and  the  degree  of  integration vary.  The 
hump-shaped pattern is observed at all levels  of  economic 
integration.  Reading  down  each  column,  one  sees  that  the 
unemployment  rate  increases,  reaches  a  peak  and  then 
decreases.  Thus  intermediate  forms  of  wage  bargaining 
generate more  unemployment  than  the  extremes.  This  is the 
Calmfors-Driffill result. 
However  the  hump  is  less  accentuated  as  one  moves 
rightward  toward  a  more  integrated  world  economy. 
Bargaining  at  the  "wrong"  level  in  a  world  that  is  only 
imperfectly  integrated  can  be  very  costly  in  terms  of 
employment,  but  it becomes  less  damaging  as  integration -47-
proceeds.  The  difference  between  the  highest  and  t·he 
lowest  level  of  unemployment  decreases  from  9.  5%  in  the 
first  column  (from  a  high  of  14.8%  to  a  low  of  5.  3%) 
where  there  is  a  low  degree  of  integration to  2.9%  (with 
a  high  of  8.  2fls  and  a  low  of  5.  3%)  in  the  last  column 
corresponding  to  the  highest  level  of  integration.  This 
result  arises  because,  as  competition  intensifies,  the 
trade-off  between  wages  and  unemployment  deteriorates, 
i.e.,  the  price to be  paid for  a  given  increase  in  wages 
is  higher  in  terms  of  lost  markets  and  unemployment. 
Self-interested  unions  will  then  be  naturally  less 
inclined  to  choose  high  wages.  It  leads  to  the  rather 
optimistic 
integration 
conclusion 
should  make 
unemployment prone. 
that  increasing  economic 
unionised  economies  less 
Another  implication  of  these  results  is  that  the 
(already  efficient)  fully  corporatist  economies  as  well 
as  those  characterized  by  very  decentralised  wage 
bargaining  structures  have  less  to  gain  from  economic 
integration  than  those  in  the  inferior  "middle  ground". 
It  is  for  the  latter  that  the  extra  dimension  of 
competition  brought  about  by  international  trade  is  the 
most  usefu!31. 
Finally,  observe that the peak  of the  hump  is moving 
towards  the  decentralised  extreme  as  the  degree  of 
economic  i·ntegration  is  increased.  This  means  that  being 
close to,  but not at,  the corporatist  extreme  can  be  very 
28.  It is important,  when  interpreting the results,  to realize that, 
in this world,  there is no  international specialization and the qains 
from exchange are limited to those attributable to the effect of 
increased degree of competition implied by opening one's borders to 
international trade. -48-
costly  in  a  situation  with  limited  integration,  but  that 
it becomes  much  less  so  in  a  highly  integrated world.  On 
the  contrary,  in  the  next  best  position  at  the 
decentralised  end  the  effect  of  a  changing  degree  of 
integration is much  less perceptible. 
This  result  helps  bring  out  one  of  the  more 
fundamental  insights  one  may  obtain  from  the  exercise  we 
have  performed.  Opening  up  a  corporatist  economy  to 
international  competition  has  in  itself  a  discrete 
negative  impact  in  its  level  of  efficiency.  When  two 
fully  centralized economies  integrate,  one  moves  from  two 
economies,  each  with  one  encompassing  union  able  to 
internalize all the  relevant  externalities,  to  an  economy 
with  two  unions  imposing external effects  on  one  another. 
One  thus  goes  one  step  down  the  corporatist  scale  with 
the  unfavourable  consequences  described  by  Calmfor-s-
Driffill.  This  negative  effect  can  however  be  undone  if 
the  force  of  international  competition  is  sufficiently 
strong  in  which  case  the  margin  for  manoeuvring  left  to 
the  unions  is  considerably  diminished  and  the  discipline 
of the  market  substitutes  for  the  advantage  of the global 
vision. 
7.3 Asvmmetric  labour market  structures 
Is  the  completion  of  the  internal  market  compatible 
with the  perpetuation of different national  labour market 
institutions?  Or  on  the  contrary,  is  a  process  of 
convergence  of  institutional  structures  inevitably 
engaged?  This  question  is  perhaps  not  too  important  at 
present  because  current  EC  members  are  not  too  far  apart -49-
on  the  corporatism  scale.  However  it  may  be  a  more 
crucial  issue  in  assessing  the  implications  of  admitting 
new  members  to  the  Community  (Scandinavia?)  with  sharply 
different  institutions.  Thus  we  have  to  face  the question 
of  whether  competition  between  alternative  models  inside 
the  Single  Market  is  likely to  produce  desirable  results 
or not. 
The  results  from  the  model,  reproduced  in  Table  8 
provide  a  mixed  set  of  answers  to  this  question.  First, 
it  can  be  seen  that,  at  low  levels  of  integration,  a 
corporatist  economy  suffers  significantly  from  the 
competition of  a  more  decentralised one,  and is,  in fact, 
quite  sensitive  to  the  wage  bargaining  structure  of  the 
economy  with  which  it  compe~es  (e.g.  the  unemployment 
rate  of  a  centralized  economy  competing  against  another 
with  2  unions  is  10.8%  while  it  is  12.4%  if  its 
competitor  .is  fully  decentralized  - column  2;  line  1/2 
vs.  line  1/32).  On  the  contrary,  the  performance  of  a 
decentralised  economy  is  left  practically  unaffected  by 
international  competition  and  it  is  insensitive  to  the 
wage  bargaining  structure of  its partner.  In  this  sense, 
one  may  infer  a  greater  fragility  of  corporatist 
institutions  in  a  process  of  opening-up  to  international 
competition. 
However,  the  key  determinant  of  the  level  of 
unemployment  appears  to  be  the  degree  of  economic 
integration  rather  than  the  level  at  which  wage 
bargaining  takes  place.  And  here  the  main  result· of  the 
previous  section  is  confirmed:  the  employment  losses 
associated with  bargaining  at  the  "wrong"  level  diminish -50-
as  integration  proceeds.  Under  full  integration,  an 
extreme  (national)  corporatist  economy  performs  as  well 
as  the  most  decentralised  one  and  it  is  much  less 
sensitive  to  the  institutional  arrangement  prevailing  in 
its partner economy  than when  integration is less close. 
One  also  observes,  rather  curiously,  that  two 
economies  with  opposite  structures  (one  fully corporatist 
with  one  national  union,  the  other  fully  decentralised 
with  32  unions)  have  a  joint  performance  that  is  better 
than  the  performance  of  two  "middle  of  the  roaders"  (2 
unions  in  one,  4  in  the  other).  The  "extremes  work  best" 
motto  remains  valid although it here  takes  on  a  different 
dimension.  The- differences  in  unemployment  rates  are 
quite  small  here.  Yet,  this  result  is  important  as  it 
suggests  that,  provided  the  process  of  economic 
integration  is  pushed  sufficiently  far,  there  should  be 
no  problem  in  the  co-existence  of  different  national 
systems  of wage  setting in an  integrated Europe. 
Finally  it is  important  to  observe  that  behind  the 
-numbers  of  Table  8  showing  closely  similar  performance 
for  the  two  types  of  wage  bargaining  structures  are 
concealed  quite  different  processes  of  adapting  to 
increasing  economic  integration.  This  is  revealed  in 
Table  9  which  shows  the  evolution  of prices  and  wages  in 
the  two  types  of  economy  as  economic  integration 
proceeds.  One  sees  that  the  path  of  economic  integration 
requires  more  adjustment  from  the  corporatist  economies 
than  from  the decentralised ones.  This  is due  to the  fact 
that  the  increasing  degree  of  competition  that 
accompanies  the  integration  process  conflicts  with  the -51-
logic  behind  attempts  to  achieve  a  corporatist  solution, 
while  it  is  of  course  much  closer  to  the  logic  of  a 
decentralised  economy.  In  that  sense,- one  should  be 
cautious  interpreting  the  results.  The  rational  trade 
unions  of  the  model  may  be  much  more  flexible  and  adapt 
much  faster to the  new  reality of  increased international 
competition  than  their  real  world  counterparts.  If  this 
is  so,  the  effects  of  economic  integration  on  the 
unemployment  level  of  fairly  centralized  economies  given 
in  the  Tables  is  likely  to  prove  too  optimistic  during 
the transition period. 
7.4  Corporatism,  growth  and inflation 
The  analysis  so  far  has  focused  on  the  link  between 
the  degree  of  centralisation  of  the  wage-bargaining 
process  and the equilibrium level  of  unemployment.  We  now 
turn  to  the  possible  relationship  with  other 
macroeconomic  indicators. 
A  high  degree  of  centralisation  is  usually 
associated  with  a  large  public  sector  (and  hence  with 
high tax rates).  This  is often  a  quid pro  quo  for gaining 
union  moderation  in  wage  demands.  Thus  total  taxes  in 
each  of  the  Nordic  countries,  Finland  excepted,  exceeds 
SO%  of  GOP,  while  in  the  u.s.  and  Japan  it is  as  low  as 
30\.  The  higher  marginal  tax  rates  in  the  former  set  of 
countries  imply·  lower  output  and  greater  welfare  losses 
through  disincentive  effects  than  would  otherwise  be  the 
case.  In  addition  these  high  tax  rates  may  act  as  a 
disincentive  to  risk-taking  and  a  reduction  in  growth32. 
29.  See e.q.  R.B.  Lucas Jr.,  The  Mechanics  of Economic Development, 
Journal of M9netary Econgmics,  1986 -52-
Is there any evidence that this is indeed the case? 
Figure  IY plots the average  growth  rate over  1974-85 
for  the  seventeen  countries appearing  in Figure  III.  Once 
again  they  are  ordered  from  the  most  centralised  to  the 
most  decentralised,  running  from  left  to  right.  Although 
there  are  many  factors  which  will  affect  average  growth 
rates,  there  is  no  obvious  inverse  relationship  between 
the  degree  of  centralisation  and  the  rate  of  growth  of 
output  over the period in question. 
Figure  V  plots  the  mean  rate  of  inflation  (GOP 
deflator)  over  the  same  period  against  the  degree  of 
centralisation.  There  are at  least  two  mechanisms  one  can 
imagine  which  might  produce  a  relationship  between 
inflation  and  the  structure  of  wage  bargaining.  First,  a 
high  degree  of centralisation usually  goes  with  a  greater 
redistribution  of  income  towards  labour  and  away  from 
capital.  To  the  extent  that  inflation  tends  to  hurt  the 
owners  of capital  (holders  of  non-indexed  debt)  more  than 
labour,  centralised  or  corporatist  economies  may  display 
a  greater  tendency  to  inflation  in  the  face.  of  adverse 
supply  shocks  like  OPEC  I  and  II.  This  would  imply  a 
positive  relationship  between  centralisation  and 
inflation  over  the  sample  period,  although  it  need  not 
imply higher average  inflation over the  long  run. 
The_  second  mechanism  suggests  that  countries  with 
intermediate  levels  of  centralisation  will  tend  to 
exhibit  higher  trend  inflation  rates.  The  argument  here 
is  that  countries  with  high  equilibrium  unemployment 
rates  are  more  likely  to  attempt  to  inflate  the  economy -53-
and  hence  reduce  unemployment33.  If the  Calmfors~Driffill 
hump-shape  hypothesis  is  correct,  then  it  follows  that 
there  is  also  likely  to  be  a  hump-shaped  relationship 
between  centralisation/corporatism  and  the  average 
inflation  rate,  other  things  equal.  Of  course  other 
things  rarely  are  equal,  and  in  particular this  argument 
depends  on  the  ability  of  the  government  to  manipulate 
the  level  of  nominal  demand.  In  countries  like  Germany, 
with  a  largely  independent  central  bank  charged  with 
maintaining the purchasing  power  of the  Mark,  this option 
is not  readily available. 
Figure  V  suggests  there  may  be  some  truth  in  both 
these  arguments.  Leaving  Germany  (and  Benelux)  aside,  the 
countries  with  an  intermediate  degree  of  centralisation 
exhibit  the  highest  average  inflation  rates,  followed 
next  by  the  most  centralised  countries,  while  the  least 
centralised countries  seem  to have  experienced the  lowest 
inflation.  Of  course,  the  imprecise  and multi-dimensional 
nature  of  the  corporatism  notion,  coupled  with  the ... fact 
that  many  other  factors  may  be  relevant  in  determining 
international  differences  in  inflation  rates  makes  us 
take  these  findings  with  a  (very  large)  dose  of  salt. 
They  are,  however,  suggestive.  It  could  also  be  argued 
that  corporatist  economies  are  more·  likely  to  engage  in 
macroeconomic  stabilisation  in  the  face  of  shocks,  which 
would  imply  a  lower  yariability  of  output  growth  and  a 
higher  variability  of  inflation  in  more  centralised 
economies.  There  is,  however,  no  obvious  relationship 
with either over the  sample period in question.  This  may, 
30.  See e.q.  R.J.  Barro and D.B.  Gordon,  A Positive Theory of 
Monetary Policy,  Journal of Political Economy,  1983 -54-
of  course,  simply  be  a  reflection  of  the  rather  limited 
information contained in the sample. 
8.  Conclusions:  the challenges of the  future 
Our  tour  of  European  labour  markets  has  led  us  to 
identify  four  major  challenges  confronting  EC  economies 
in  the  near  and  more  distant  future.  First,  while  the 
recent past  was  characterised by  the  demands  created by  a 
rapidly  growing  labour  force,  the  next  20  years  will  be 
marked  by  a  progressive  "greying"  of  the  working 
population.  We  have  noted  that  the  decision  to  enter  or 
to  leave  the  labour  force  contains  an  externality  whose 
importance  will  grow  with  the  increasing  burden  imposed 
on  the  working  population  by  expenditures  on  and 
transfers  to  the  non-working.  This  justifies  measures  to 
facilitate  entry  into  (by  married  women  especially)  or 
encourage  later  exit  from  the  labour  force  (by  older 
workers) •  Tax  incentives  to  encourage  later  retirement 
should be  married with  allowing greater  freedom  of choice 
in the decision of when  to retire. 
Second,  a  careful  study  of  the  recent  past  has  led 
us  to  conclude  that  a  technologically  induced  shift  in 
the  relative  demal)d  for  skilled  versus  unskilled  labour 
has  occurred  and  is  likely  to  continue.  This  change 
creates  a  major  challenge  for  education  policy  in  the 
Community.  Among  other  measures,  an  expansion  of  adult 
education  is  called  for.  This  expansion  should  be 
achieved  through  a  greater  use  of  the  competitive 
mechanism  than  is currently  the  case  in  youth  education. -55-
To  this  end  we  recommend  competition  betweep  public  and 
private  institutions  in  the  supply  of  education  coupled 
with a  subsidised public adult-student  loan program. 
One  major  component  of the  future  of  European  labour 
markets  should  be  an  increase  in  the  degree  of  worker 
mobility.  While  there  can,  in  principle,  be  excess 
mobility,  our  view  is that cultural  and  language barriers 
are  sufficient  to  prevent  this  possibility,  and  that 
removing  other  obstacles  to  the  mobility  of  workers, 
including  the  unemployed,  will  be  beneficial.  Attention 
should  however  be  paid  at  removing  international  tax 
distortions  that  could  motivate  inefficient  relocations 
of  highly  specialized  labour.  We  have  further  underlined 
the  fact  that  this  call  for  mobility  has  important 
implications  for  the  coordination  of  social  ·security 
schemes  and  have  illustrated  the  issues  by  focusing  on 
the  necessary  linkages  between  national  unemployment 
insurance  and pension schemes. 
Finally,  analysing  the  impact  of  integration  on  the 
performance  of  alternative  labour  market  structures,  we 
arrived  at  the  generally  optimistic  view  that  whatever 
inefficiencies  have  been  linked  to  the  structure  of  wage 
bargaining,  these  inefficiencies  should  tend to disappear 
under  the  process  of  economic  integration.  This  is  the 
fourth  challenge  we  identify  as  we  observe  that  some 
types  of  institutional  arrangements  are  fragile  under 
incomplete  integration.  Adapting  to  a  more  competitive, 
integrated,  world  will  generate  great  strains  for  some 
economies  and  a  lack  of  flexibility  could  lead  to 
significant  costs  during  the  transition process,  a  point -56-
already  made  in  the  last  annual  report  of  the  CEPS 
Macroeconomic Policy Group. T
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Table  2  Participation rates of in4ividuals aged  SS  and over 
(in selected countries,  in percent) 
Men  Women 
Country  55-64  65  +  55-64 
France 
1965  '76.0  28.3  36.9 
1970  75.4  19.5  40.0 
1975  68.9  13.9  35.9 
1980  68.5  '7.5  39.7 
1985  50.1  5.3  31.0 
Germany 
1965  84.6  24.0  30.2 
1970  82.2  19.9  29.9 
1975  68.1  10.8  24.8 
1980  65.5  '7.0  27.2 
1985  5'7.5  5.2  23.9 
Italy 
1965  54.8  18.4  14.3 
1970  48.2  12.9  10.6 
1975  42.4  10.4  8.5 
1980  39.6  12.6  11.0 
1984  38.2  8.9  10.5 
Netherlands 
1965  ..  .  .  .  . 
19'71  80.8  11.4  14.9 
1975  '73.0  8.0  14.3 
1980  63.6  4.8  14.3 
1985  53.8  4.0  14.5 
Spain 
1965  ..  .  .  .  . 
1972  84.2  25.9  22.0 
1975  '79.8  18.8  23.0 
1980  '75.'7  12.3  21.2 
1985  66.3  5.9  20.0 
United Kinqdo R 
1965  92.7  23.7  35.6 
1970  91.3  20.2  39.3 
1975  8'7.8  15.8  40.3 
1980  81.8  10.5  39.2 
1985  66.4  7.6  34.1 
Source  "Le vieillissement d6moqraphique,  cons6quencea pour la 
politique sociale",  OECD,  1988 
65  + 
11.5 
8.6 
5.8 
3.3 
2.2 
'7.8 
6.5 
4.5 
3.1 
2.5 
4.7 
2.6 
2.1 
3.5 
2.1 
.  . 
2.3 
1.8 
0.9 
0.'7 
.  . 
'7.7 
6.3 
3.8 
2.1 
6.5 
6.4 
4.9 
3.6 
3.2 -59-
Table  3  :  Participation rates of  women 
(working population as  a  proportion of the total female population between 
age  15  and  64) 
Country  1970  1975  1979  1982  1985  . 
1986 
Belgium  40.2  44.1  47.4  49.4  50.5  51.3 
Denmark  57.9  62.8  70.2  73.6  76.4  78.2 
Germany  48.1  49.6  49.6  50.0  50.3  51.1 
Greece  32.7  36.4  41.8 
Spain  32.4  32.3  32.3  33.1  34.0 
France  48.5  51.0  54.5  54.7  54.9  55.3 
Ireland  34.1  34.7  35.0  36.9  36.8  36.8 
Italy  34.0  35.4  39.2  40.7  41.8  43.0 
Luxemburg  33.7  37.9  39.9 
Netherlands  30.5  32.0  34.4  39.4  40.9  41.1 
Portugal  48.9  52 .8<  55.6  55.7  54.5 
United Kingdom  50.8  55.3  57.9  57.0  60.3  61.0 
EUR  12  45.3  47.0  47.8  49.0  50.0 
USA  51.1  58.9  61.8  63.8  64.9 
Japan  54.0  54.7  57.2  57.2  57.4 
Source  "Le march6 du travail dans  la communaut6",  Economie  Europ6enne, 
38,  1988. -60-
TA8LI  1  IJ)UCA'l'ION  AND  IMPLOXMEN'l'  GBOJITH 
GERMANY  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Sectors  share of(*)  employment  share of(*)  employment 
"uneducated"  growth(**)  "uneducated"  growth(**) 
workers  workers 
Agriculture  50.6  -2.4  74.7  -1.5 
Mininq&Quarryinq  29.9  -1.4  56.2  -4.1 
Manufacturing  26.9  -1.0  57.5  -2.7 
E1ectricity,Gas&Water  1~.3  1.2  42.6  -1.4 
Construction  23.8  -2.0  46.6  -0.8 
Retailing  23.7  0.2  71.9  0.9 
Transport  19.5  0.0  62.5  -0.4 
Financial  11.3  2.4  49.8  3.8 
Other Services  16.3  2.2  46.9  1.7 
(*)  Proportion of employed labour force with less than upper  secondary 
education,  1988,  (not  comparable accross countries) • 
(**)  Change  in industry share in total employment  1973-87  (in percent) 
Source  :  OECD,  Employment  outlook,  July 1989 t
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 Belqium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Hamburq 
Bavaria 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
West 
South 
United Kingdom 
-62-
Table  6 
Relative wages,  1983  (average•100) 
101 
134 
116 
82 
82 
81 
110 
93 
129 
107 
116 
106 
Source  V D.  Norman,  Comments  on D.  Neven,  The  Gainers  and the losers 
of from  1992,  Economic  Policy,  1990  (forthcoming). -63-
TAILI  7  ;  Symmetrig  wage  strugturas 
Unemployment  in • 
Degree of  Less  integrated  More  integrated 
integration  +--- ---+ 
Degree of  col.  1  col.  2  col.  3  col.  4  col.  5 
centralisation 
1  5.3  5.3  5.3  5.3  5.3 
Total 
2  14.5  10.5  7.3  6.0  5.4 
Number 
4  1.L.I  lid  1LJt  8.9  7.0 
of 
8  11.2  11.0  10.5  .L1.  .LZ 
Unions 
16  8.6  8.6  8.5  8.4  8.0 
64  6.5  6.5  6.5  6.5  6.5 
The elasticity of substitution between the baskets of goods  produced by 
the two countries  (the parameter 81 of the appendix)  takes the following 
values  : 
Col.  1 
Col.  4 
81  •  1.5,  Col.  2 
81  •  10,  Col.  5 
81  •  2.5,  Col.  3  :  81  - 5 
81  •  25. -64-
TABLI  8  :  Asymmetric  wage  structure 
Unemployment  in ' 
Degree of  Less  integrated  More  integrated 
integration  .---- ---+ 
Degree of 
centralisation  Col.  1  Col.  2  Col.  3  Col.  4  Col.  5 
i~e.  Number  of 
unions in each 
country 
respectively 
1  14.7  10.8  7.5  6.1  5.5 
2  14.6  13.2  11.0  8.9  7.0 
1  15.0  11.3  7.7  5.9  5.1 
4  10.8  10.8  10.4  9.7  8.2 
1  15.4  11.9  8.4  6.3  5.1 
8  8.3  8.3  8.4  8.3  8.0 
1  15.6  !.2.4  9.1  7.1  5.7 
~2  6.4  6.4  6.4  6.5  6.5 
2  15.2  13.5  11.0  8.9  7.0 
4  11.0  10.9  10.5  9.7  8.2 
2  15.6  13.7  11.1  8.9  7.0 
8  8.3  8.4  8.4  8.4  8.0 
2  15.9  13.9  11.3  9.0  7.0 
32  6.4  6.4  6.4  6.5  6.5 
4  11.5  11.2  10.7  9.7  8.2 
8  8.5  8.5  8.4  8.3  8.0 
4  11.7  11.4  10.8  9.8  8.2 
32  6.4  6.4  6.4  6.5  6.5 
8  8.7  8.7  8.6  8.5  8.0 
32  6.5  6.5  6.5  6.5  6.5 
The  different columns correspond to the same  value of the elasticity of 
substitution as in Table  7 -65-
Table  9  Priga and wage  layel• (or different daqr&a• o( intaq£ation 
Degree of  Less  integrated  More  integrated 
integration  +--- value of index  ---. 
Col.  1  Col.  2  Col.  3  Col.  4  Col.  5 
PA  0.519  0.511  0.503  0.497  0.490 
PB  0.507  0.506  0.502  0.497  0.490 
WA  0.565  0.548  0.528  0.512  0.497 
"a  0.447  0.447  0.442  0.434  0.422 
In this illustcation country A has  4  unions  while country B baa  8. 
Each  column corresponds to the same  value of 81  aa in Table 7. -66-
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Figure II 
Relative hourly wage~. 1977-85 
(Hourly wage all industries, converted to ECU; average each 
year= 100) 
Source : V.  D. Norman, 
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Figure III 
Change  tn unemployment rate between ·1963-74 
and  1974-85 averages, for seventeen countries 
ranked according to degree of central  I  sat  ton. 
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Figure IV 
Average growth rates for seventeen countrtes 
ranked by degree of centra1tsat  1on 
'974-1985. 
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Figure V 
Average rate of tnflat  ton for seventeen 
OECD countries ranked by degree of central tsat ton 
1974-1985. 
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Appendix 
The model underlying our discussion in section 7 can be described as follows.  There are 
two countries with wage bargaining structures that are more or less centralised.  Their 
economies may be more or less closely integrated.  One can thus evaluate the impact of 
integration (the Single Market) with given institutions, as well as· trace out how changes 
in those institutions affect the gains from integration. 
There are two key elements in the model.  First the degree of economic integration between 
the two economies is represented by a  variable willingness to substitute between goods 
produced at home and abroad.  Each country produces 32 national products (giving 64 
in total).  In the limit, when the goods produced in each country are perfect substitutes, 
which we mean to represent the total absence of trading costs, price competition is at its 
extreme and the pnce structures of the two economies cannot difFer.  At the opposite end 
of the spectrum,  wh~n the goods are not so readily substituted across national borders, 
the weight  of international competition is lighter and producing at high price and high 
cost is a viable alternative.  We interpret the latter as corresponding to the present, and 
the former to the Community after 1992. 
In addition, wages may be negotiated at difFerent levels. There is one union in each industry 
which sets the nominal wage.  The unions'monopoly power is the source of unemployment 
in this model.  Each union may act in isolation and set the wage with regard to the interest 
of its members only, or it may act in cooperation with other unions, taking account of the 
welfare of the workers in all the industries concerned. The trade-oft' facing a typical union 
(or a confederation of unions) is the following.  Higher wages,  while benefiting employed 
members, have t'WO  adverse consequences:  first they directly decrease employment in the 
industry. Second, higher wages also lead to a higher general level of prices which will ofFset 
to some extent the original wage increase. 
Each country produces, under national brands, 32 products (64 in total).  At the limit of 
economic integration, the baskets of goods produced in the two countries will be considered 
to be perfect substitutes.  In each of the 32 national industries there is a large number of 
price-taking firms  with identical  production functions.  The production possibilities of 
industry i (  i =  1 ...  64) is summarized by 
(1)  rf =  AKf +  (1-A)Lf -72-
where the industry capital stock Ki is fixed and will be normalized at 1, La is the quantity 
of labour input used in the industry, A  and p are fixed parameters.  At given wage  Wi 
(set by monopoly unions, see later) and given market dearing output price Pi, industry i's 
labour demand resulting from profit maximization is 
(2) 
.:1  L·=(!(_1  Wi)_P _1-A], 
I  A  1-Api  1-p  A 
while the output levelyi satisfies: 
(3) 
-t  ._, 
Pi = (1 -A)  7  wi(l - Aul'>  , 
For each industry, the equilibrium price results from setting 
where Zi is the consumers'demand for product i. 
Consumers are alike in the two countries.  There is no build-in preference for the home 
goods.  Consumem'preferences are represented by a  nested CES utility function  (Dixit 
Spence preferences) with five levels (indexed j  = 1 ...  5) and elasticities of substitution It 
(at the most aggregate level, i.e.  between the two countries indices) to Bs  (at the least 
disaggregate level).  See figure A for a schematic representation.  Thus if consumption of 
good j  at level i is z(i,j), 
(4) 
1;-1  1·-1  8 
z(i,j) = (:r:(i +  1,2j-1)  1•  +  :r:(i +  1, 2}) T'] •-• 
With z(l, 1) the individual's consumption of the most aggregated good, his utility is a 
constant elasticity function 
(5)  u(z) = z(1, 1)1-a 
1-a -73-
where  Q  is  the relative rate of ~sk aversion.  Ea.Ch  worker has only his wage income if 
he is employed; he receives unemployment benefits amounting to a fraction r of the full 
employment real wage  to  1 if he is unemployed.  Total nominal d~and  in each country 
is denominated by Mi and normalized at 32.  Letting PA  be the price vector prevailing 
in country A:  PA  = {p(6, 1), ...  ,p(6,32)} and PB  similarly the vector of prices for  the 
products of  country B: PB = (p{6, 33), ...  ,p(6, 64)), then the worldwide demand for goods 
is equivalent to that of a representative consumer with nominal income M  = MA +  Ms, 
facing the price vector (p  A,  p  B) and with the utility function above.  Let it be 
(6) 
With this utility function, the relevant price index for commodity z(  i, j)(  i = 2, ...  , 5) is 
(7) 
for p( i + 1, 2j - 1  ), p(  i + 1, 2j) the appropriate price indices at the lower level.  Similarly 
for level6. Price p{2, 1) then is the overall price index for the goods produced in country 
A while p(2, 2) is the index for the goods produced in country B. The relevant consumer 
price index then is 
(8) 
There is one union per industry.  It acts as a monopoly imposing a nominal wage inde-
pendently or in cooperation with other unions.  The utility of industry i  union is  given 
by 
(9) -74-
where v(  w; / P) is the (indirect) utility of a representative worker with wage w;, Li  is the 
labour force  affected to industry i  (set equal to 1) and P  is the consumer price index. 
Note that we assume that labour is industry and country specific.  While the first part of 
this hypothesis is innocuous since the unemployment rates will always be identical across 
different industries of the same country, the second part is not, as unemployment rates 
may differ  across countries.  We  can defend this assumption as being in line with our 
discussion on the effectively limited degree of international labour mobility in Europe. 
Relative to the model,  the post-1992 EC should have significantly more capital and a 
little more international labour mobility.  However it will have less intra-country labour 
mobility and less perfect mobility of  goods. Given that different factors and goods mobility 
are substitutes in a model like ours, we believe the effective forces leading to equalization 
of factor price& and unemployment rates are not underrepresented here. 
The model is dosed by assuming that each union maximizes (9) independently or in coop-
eration with other unions (starting with unions in neighbouring industries and going up 
the trees represented in figure A).  The solution to this problem can be shown to be an 
industry wage satisfying 
(10) 
where J is the number of unions cooperating and 
(J 
•  - dlogpj  v· 
J•- dlogwi  '  J,i 
PlcX~t 
Sfr  =  'VA: 
MA+Ms 
aLi  wi  u  (  <  > ')  .  £i=-·-=-- A+ 1-AL.  ,Va 
awi  Pi  A  I 
Equations (2), (3), (6) and (10) de&ne the equilibrium of the model.This system cannot 
be given an analytical solution.  Rather the equilibrium is computed under the following 
parametric assumptions, all borrowed from  Calmfors-Driflill for  comparability (see  the 
original article for a justification) :  A = 0.3;  o  =  2;  tT  =  1 ~, = 0.33;  ~!~,'  = 0. 7.  The 
results are given in Tables 7-9. Countr)! A 
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